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INTRODUCTION
For 7ears Great Britain bad followed tbe time
honored doctrine in foreign affairs or maintaining the
balance or power which meant
to resist by diplomacy or arms the
growth or any European State at once
ao formidable and so potentially hos
tile as to threaten our national liber
ties, the security of our shores, the
safet7 or our commerce or t�e integrity
of our foreign possessions.

With the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 and tbe

establishment or the Metternichian concept or the con
cert of Europe, Britain's historic determination to

preserve the balance of power gave war to a new attitude
in foreign affairs that became known ae "splendid iso
lationism."

This new approach to international relations

was based on her desire to be free from continental en
tanglements in order to devote all ber energies to devel
oping ber industry and commerce; and at the same time to
protect her economic and political "interests" by dip
lomacy or the use or force whenever and wherever they
were threatened.

Throughout the nineteenth century the

policy or nsplendid isolationism" was followed, regardless
1oeorge Peabody Gooch, Studies In Diplomac and
l p. 87.
Statecraft (London: Longmana, Green and Co., 194.3,
iv

V

or the changing· definition of British "interests," by
all ministries whether they were Whig or Tory, Liberal
or Conservative.

The policy was sorely tested on numer

ous oocasions when conrronted with the challenges to her
aims by other states, both large and small.

One or the

most serious and longlasting threat� was known as the
"Eastern Question."

In the nineteenth century the Eastern Question

was a problem that confronted not only Great Britain but
moat or Europe as well.

The tottering, disintegrating

Ottoman Empire, the demise or which had been expected and
anticipated for at least a century, was the prize that
certain European powers were waiting to grasp.

It was

an empire which at this time not only extended to the
borders

or Austria, taking in the lands of the Greeks,

Serbs and Bulgars, but also controlled the vital passage
into the Black Sea, the Dardanelles.

Tbe Ottoman Turk

in Europe was an alien aubstanoe, having no link either
in religion, race or social customs witb the Balkan peoples.
For Russia tbe death ot tbe empire would mean a
long-sougbt tootbold in tbe eastern Mediterranean and an
extension or her "protectorate" over all Slavs in the
Balkans.

To France the dismemberment or tbe once-strong

Turk would make possible gains in lands and influence in
North Africa as well as in the Near East, plus a boost to

vi
her prestige, wbich always figured in French thinking.
Austrian interest in the Balkans stemmed from the desire
to contain any mounting feeling• of nationalism among

the Slavs which might in the long run weaken the Hap burg
empire.

The most complex concern over the downfall of

the Ottoman Empire was the one exhibited by Prince Otto
Von Bismarck, chancellor

or Germany. He was dedicated

not only to the maintenance of a Bismarckian peace in

Europe, meaning a peace dictated by German aims, but also
to the pacification

or Austria and Russia over the issue

or Pan-Slaviam. Thus, tbe Eastern Question was basically

the problem of what sbould be done about the declining
Ottoman Empire.

Two alternatives presented themselves

during the nineteenth century:

regenerate the Empire

through internal reform and international protection of
tbe status quo; or partition its European poaseaaions.
While moat

or the major powers chose the second course,

Great Britain, in ber determination to maintain a "Pax
Britannica," obose the first.

Paramount in her consi

deration was the necessity to uphold the dictum so ably
stated bJ Gooch that "Britain bas no eternal friendships
and no eternal enmities, only eternal interesta."2 Her
"eternal interests" demanded that Constantinople and the
Straits be controlled b7 a pro-British and independent
Turkish government.

Thus, the naval status quo in the

2Ibid., P• 88.

eastern Mediterranean and the British lifeline to India
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would be protected against Russian encroachment.

Britain's commitment to the continued existence

or the Ottoman Empire thus brought about her involvement

in the Eastern Question which finally erupted with great
severity in 1875 after having smoldered tor over fifty
years.

It is the purpose or this paper to follow in some

detail the course of British diplomatic policy in the

Near East up to 1878 when an attempt to solve the Eastern
Question was made in the Congress of Berlin.

The major

emphasis is on tbe events just prior to the Congress from

1875 to 1878.

CHAPTER I
THE EASTERN QUESTION:
Treaty of London to the Treaty of Paris:

1815-1856

To Lord John Morley, a late nineteenth century
liberal statesman

and

Gladstone's renowned biographer,

it was "that shifting, intractable, and interwoven tan-

gle or conflicting interests, rival peoples and antagon

istic faiths that !:,,art.I veiled under the easy name of
the Eastern Question."1 Within the Ottoman Empire the

rising tide of nationalism, coupled with growing rivalry
among the Slav themselves, was running bead on against

absolutism.

In addition, there were major religious problems

caused by the fact that not only Moslem.a, but also Roman
Catholics and Greek Orthodox, inhabited the area.

Pol

itically the Empire was racked by corruption, inefficiency, and ruled by a government unable and often un
willing to effect reforms or promote unity.

A

few Sultans

had seen the necesaity to Europeanize Turkey, but most
had fallen victim to "Moslem indulgence and Christian
alcohol," or found that "effective regeneration of the
1J. A. R. Marriott, _T�b�e_,,E_aster n
_ _ _ _ _ .....,..,............,.__,._....._
Historical Studr In European Diplomacy
Clarendon Presa, 1930), p. 1.
1

2

country was made impossible by the dead hand of Islamic

law and by the sullen resistance or a fanatical popula

tion."2 What little retorm that had taken place was

mainlJ unenlightened and capri cious.

Extensive court

expenditures, neglect o f tbe e111pire, excessive bureau

c r acy, and discri mination against non-Moslems were noth
i ng
in

novel in Turke7.

Thus the

increasing

problems with

the Moslem 'l'llrkisb state were generallJ acknowledged,

and the term "the Eastern Question" soon enters the
European diplomatic vocabular1.3

Great Br itain bad been involved in the Near East

for rears because or the

danger

to be r tr ade route to

India inherent in the expans i on of Russian influence to-

ward the

sphorus, the Dardanelles and Constantinople.

It bad been known for a century and a half that Russia
had three main objectives:

(1) to reestablish her naval

and commercial supremacy in the Black Sea; (2) to secure
a tree outlet to the Mediterranean; and (3) to obtain

from the Porte an acknowledgement of ber position aa
0
r
D
id
8
Crisis o� �8 -�8 8� •T!e
University Press, 193

th
st!:.}!��
?o��:
!rH1s�:
ii;�i;-i;
•

3William L. Langer, European Alliances and Align
ments, 1871-18&0 (2d ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1950), pp. 60- 1.

champion or the liberties, political and ecclesiastical,

3

or the Christian aubjecta or tbe 8ultan. 4

Following the defeat or Bapoleon, the orticial

policy of tbe British government was dominated by tbe

Tory foreign minister, Lord Castlereagh, wbo, until his

death in 1822, felt that it was necessary to maintain the
status quo guaranteed by the Quadruple Alliance or 1815

at the Congress or Vienna in order to allow Britain to

consolidate gains made in her increasing overseas empire.
At times his attitude was in opposition to British pub
lic opinion which was generally &JDlPathetio to rising

nationalism everywhere.

In defense of Castlereagh whose

successtul conduct of foreign affairs during the closing
years ot the Napoleonic Wars bad won him gratitude and

respect, it should be noted that in bis desire to res

tore Europe to normalit1 be bad to concur in repressive

policies toward nationalistic outbreaks or stand aside
and otter no opposition.

In the Near East Castlereagh felt that it was an

absolute necessity to keep Russia as tar removed from

arrairs as possible, meanwhile to maintain Turkish inte

grity as an additional safeguard.

Russia, on the other

4Marriott, The Eastern guestion, pp. 278-279.

4
band, saw in the Pan-Slav movement that was manifesting
itself in Greek nationalism, the key not only to an en

larged sphere or her influence in tbe emerging Balkan

states, but also territorial aggrandizement at tbe ex
pense of the

Ottoman Empire.

Even though Alexander I

publically disavowed the independence- movement at first,
pan-slaviam won out over bis anti-nationalistic views. 5

In Maroh, 1821, the Greeks revolted against their

Turkish masters.

Their goal wa.a to drive tbe Turk out

of Europe and establish a new Byzantine Empire with 1ta
capitol in Conatantinople.6 The struggle tor Greek inde
pendence precipitated the first of many Eastern arises
during the nineteenth century in which Russia deterll11ned
to play her historic role as patron or tbe Balkan Slavs.
Lord Castlereagh, in meeting tbe challenge to the status
quo in the Hear East, was joined bJ George Canning and

other Tory colleagues who agreed that it was of greater
importance to check Russian expansion than to support

tbe Greek revolt.

The sympathy of the English people

for the Greeks and Phil-hellenism had been thoroughly
aroused by the romantic deeds of Lord B7ron and others,
bowe�er, and public sentiment had reached a high peak.
$Alexander Onou, nThe Memoirs of Count N. Ignat1ev," The Slavonic and East European Review, X (December

1931), 394-395.

6J. A. R. Marriott, England Since Waterloo
(London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1954), P•

42.

Castlereagh commented to Metternich:

5

The public bere of courae look on
the question or Greek independence
aa one of liberalism, but the1 are
not prepared to see tbe libert1 ot
the Greeks bought at the prioe ot
Russian supremacy in the Mediterrean. 1
The same view was to prevail in Conservative circles vben
the Balkan independence movements erupted after 1875.

When George Canning succeeded Castlereagh at the

Foreign Office in 1822 be realized the public support or
Greek independence bad become so wide-spread that it must
be upheld regardless
to the contrary.

or any or his own personal feelings

Thus, at the Congress or Verona in

October of that same year, Great Britain's delegate, the
Duke of Wellington, laid stress upon the need tor "neu
trality between the Turks and the Greeks, and upon the
possibility of ail taoto Greek Government being even
tually acoorded."8
After tbe Congress of Verona Canning made it clear
tha t Britain would no longer participate in the European
coalition because

or her disapproval of collective inter

vention to maintain unpopular regimes as being against
basic English principles.

Throughout 1821 Canning pla1ed

7R. w. Seton-Watson, Britain In Europe, 17891 1 : A Surve or Forei n Polio {Cambridge: The
verait1 Press, 1
, p. 2.
Harold Temperley, "Canning and the Conferences
of the Four Allied Governments at Paris, 182)-1826, "
The Alllerican Historical Review, XXX (October 1924), 16.

a "lone hand" in tbe Eastern �uestion by bis recognition

6

Meanwhile, Alexander I proposed a meet

or tbe Greeks.'

ing to settle the Greek affair, and in response the Bri
tish foreign secretarJ sent bis cousin, Sir Stratford
Canning, to St. Petersburg before taking up bis new posi
tion as ambassador at Constantinople.
Tbe death

or the Tsar brought to the Russian

throne Niobolaa I, who appeared to Canning to be even

more desirous or war with 1'urke7 than his brother.

To

avert such a war the foreign secretary asked tbe Duke ot

Wellington to go to St. Petersburg to effect a "confiden
tial concert between Russia and England."10 The result
was the aigning
April

4,

or the Protocol or St. Peteraburg or

1826, wbereb1 the possibility or the creation

or an autonomous Greek state was recognized.

A Greece

tbat would be a vassal state of tbe Turk to tbe extent
that it would have to pay an annual tribute; but would
be given freedom of administration, religion, and com
merce.

The Protocol also stated that Russia and Britain

would renounce territorial extension or commercial advantage in th

area.11

Since Canning had felt that France

should be included, she signed the Treat1 of London along
with Britain and Russia on JulJ 6, 1827,

The Treaty

provided among other things that the Greeks should be
9seton-Watson, Britain In Europe, p. 101.
lO
l!?.!.!!•, P• 109.
llibid., P• 112.

1
governed b1 ofticials or tbeir own choice, but "subject

to the Porte's approval;" and tb t "the Powers renounce
any exclusive territorial or coDJil'leroia.l advantage, and

undertake to guarantee the new settlement," by force if
necessary.12 Canning's great work on this triple alli

ance was to be his laat for be died tbe following month.
The Porte proved to be aa intransigent on the

offer to mediate between Turkey and tbe Greeks aa it
bad been on the April� P rotocol.

The Sultan was obdur

ate, even after the Egyptian navy, defending tbe Turkish

position, bad suffered almost complete destruction at

the bands ot the allied fleet at Navarino on October 20,

1827.

The Britiab foreign office during the Wellington

ministry could not take action in 1828 because the ener
gies of the country were concentrated on the internal

crisis brought about b1 the struggle tor Catholic Eman
1
cipation. 3 Thus, the British were on the sideline when

Russi took up arms against tbe Turks.

Tb

halting and

negative policy followed by W llington and Lord Aberdeen,
the foreign secretary and Canning's succeaaor, was even

more in evidence when minor territorial concessions wer

made to the Greeks at the London Conference on March 22, 1829.
12�., P• 118.

13M tternicb never ceased to reproach Britain tor

its weakness during this period, but public opinion in
Europe made it impossible to do anything for the Turks un
til the Greeks were given their freedom. See Webster,
Tbe Foreign Policy of Palmerston (London 1951), I, 84.

8
The Rue o-Turkiab war ended with the acceptance
or Greek independence by the Turks in the Treaty or Adr1anople in September, 1829, by wbicb Russian prestige was
greatl7 increased.

Among the provisions or Adrianople

which bad considerable bearing on Great Britain's posi
tion were the following:

(1) Rus1ia_waa given title to

Georgia and the other provinces or the Caucasus; (2) all
neutral vessels were guaranteed tree navigation

or the

Black Sea and the Danube; (3) practical autonomy waa

granted to the principalities or Moldavia and Wallachia

under Russian protection; and (4) Russian traders in Tur

key were to be under the excluai•e jurisdiction ot their
own conaula.14 The fear of Wellington that Greece would
be dominated by Russia was seen when the London Protocol

or Februar1 3, 1830, proclaimed Greek independence, and

that "the new state was to enjoy the guarantee of Russia,
France and Britain."15
The Tory regime, which bad ruled Britain tor

nearly r1rt1 years, ended in 1830; and a Whig oabinet,
beaded bf Earl Orey, took office.
call, an epoch or reform.

Thus, began, what some

The foreign policr or the Whigs

from 1830 to 1841 was to be directed by Lord Palmerston,
who bad begun bis political career as a Tory.

While

sympathizing with tbe liberal and national movements that
were slowly rising, he was to boldly aasert the interest
14Marriott, The Eastern Question, p. 223.

15seton-Watson, Britain In Europe, p. 140.

and bonor ot Great Britain whenever international oom

9

licationa aro•••

After Adrianople, British statesmen began to see

that Russia now menaoed tbe balance

or power, and could

oballenge Britain in the Mediterranean as well.

Tbis

was the view taken by Lord Palmerston who bad been a greater
protagonist ot a free and large Greece in the 1820•1 than
Canning bad been.

But it was not until the earl7 1830 1 1

that be, u Ore1•s foreign ■ecretary, came to the oonolu
eion that it waa essential to British interests to pre
■erve the Ottoman Empire•16 Wber.eaa Castlereagh and

Canning bad

r

lt that "Turke7 torms in the system ot Eu

rope a necessary evil," her support was tor the purpose
or protecting the status quo on the Continent.17 Through
out moat ot tbe nineteenth century tbe commitment to sup

port the Ottoman Empire vaa generally adhered to bJ the
British government and the British people.

Toward tne polioJ or splendid isoiation Palmer

ston drew a distinction between "intervention bf deed
18
and intervention bJ word."
When in 1832 the Turkish

Sultan attempted to aecure the assistance or England to

16 Sir Charles Webster, Tbe Fore1
Policy ot P mer ton 18 0-18 l: Bri ain The Liberal1ovement and �be
Eastern Question London: G. Bell and Sons, td., 19
, I,
17seton-Watson, Britain In Europe, p. 61.
l8webster, I, 168.

10
aid in putting down the dissident armies or Mebemet Ali,
Khedive of Egypt, Palmerston found it was not an easy

policy to follow.
awar

Ali was most ambitious, and was well

or the Sultan's weaknesses, both militarily and

politically.

He relt be should have some rewa d atter

coming to the Sultan's aid in the war against Russia, and
especially since be bad lost bis fleet at Navarino.

The

EgJ"Ptian marched eastward, aucoesst'ully defeating toroes
sent bf the Sultan.

Tbere seemed t

be nothing to atop

Ali from securing all ot Asia Minor, but ultimately be
had to be 1atistied with Syria.

Stratford Canning, Bri

tain 1 a amba aador to the Porte, strongly urged tbat a
British naval expedition be sent to the Syrian coast to
aid the Turk .

Palmerston, anxious to

upport tbe Sultan,

was overruled by the Grey cabinet wbicb was preoccupied
witb the internal problem of reform and also the Belgium
crisis.

Nor was the cabinet moved when France's Talleyrand

proposed joint intervention.

Tbua, tbe Porte bad to turn

to Russia for aid in putting down Alita inaurreotion, aid
that tbe Tsar was moat anxious to provide. 19

Pal.ll'lerston

was to comment later that Britain's refusal to help Tur
keJ at tbat time "bas been the oauae of more danger to
the peace

or Europe, to the balance of power and to the

interest or England than perhaps any one determination

11

ever before produced,•20 for the end r sult was increased
Russian intervention in Turkey.
Tbe Tsar greeted tbe Sultan•a pleas tor aid bf
sending Russian troops and tbe Ruaaian fleet. Both Eng
land and France were alarmed and threatened to bring

their varahipa to force tbe Straits.
withdrew:

The Russian rorces

.but their withdrawal was prec eded by a treaty

with the Porte or "mutual alliance and defence by land
and aea.•21 This was the Tre ty or Unkiar-Skeleasi (July 8,

1833) that included a secret clause bf wb!ch the Sultan

pledged to cloae tbe Dardanelles to all toreign warships,
in violation or the Treaty or Adrianople.

thus barred from entry into tbe Black Sea.

Britain waa

When the sec

ret arrangement became known Britain and France protested
to no avail.

Unkiar-Bkeleasi taught them a leasonJ and
the defense or Constantinople b came a sort or dogma.22

Gr at Britain kept a watchful fleet near at band.

"It tbe alliance at Unkiar-Skeleaai had no otber perman-

ent result, it taught the British to keep constant vigil
ance over the Porte."23 Strict caution was deemed neoe aar7
20

Webster, I, 284.
21seton-Wataon, Britain In Europe, p. 176.
22Barold TemperleJ, "Britiab Policy Tow rds Parliainen
tary Rule and Con titutionali1m in Turkey, 1830-1914," Tbe
Cambridge Historical Journal, IV, (1933), 256-257.
23vernon John Puryear, En land 1 Russia and the Straits
Question: 1844.-18$6 (Berkeley: ff:hl.versity or California
Press, 1931}, pp. 106-107.

to prevent a possible Russian occupation of Constanti
nople and the Straits.

Within the Ottoman Empir

12

corruption was ram

pant, reaching from tbe court or the Sultan down to the
lowest tax collector in the realm.

Court intrigue and

a1aaaaination were almost commonplace.

The tenet or

helping Turkey to reform itself waa soon associ ted by
Britain with the need to uphold tbe integritJ of the
Ottoman Empire.

!bus, to the British people, humani

tarian interests were combined with the true plea ot
realpolitik.

It bas been said that two men outside the for

eign office helped shape British foreign policy in the
Near East in the first halt of the nineteenth century

bf almost over-shadowing the efforts ot the various
foreign aecretariea.

The first of these was David Urqu

hart, "the moat redoubtable Turoopbil and Russopbobe of
bis da1,"24 who was sent on a special mission to Turkey
by Palmerston in August, 1833, to report on the commer
cial possibilities of tbat area.

He was also to dis

cover the extent of resources in tbe Turkish dominions
for grains and other produoe.25 Urquhart, whose mission
24-seton-Wataon, Britain In Europe, p. 184.
25Pur1ear, England, Russi and tbe Strait§. pp. 107.

was secret, confined his surve1 to European Turkey and

13

the Black Sea region, but also spent some time in Con
stantinople. His report• were colored by the rear that
Ruaaia ulti atel1 t·ould expand through Turke7 into Persia,
and build up an Aaiatic power which would menace India.
Bia remedy waa British seizure of the-Straita. 26 · These
reports, plus various pamphlets wb.ich be wrote in the

Forties and Firtiea, provided, perhaps unconsciously, the
baa1

tor British procedure in Turkey tor the next twenty

years, as well aa intluencing public opinion against Ruasia.27
The other man was Sir Stratford Canning, cousin

of George Canning, and also a Turcophil and Russopbobe.

Sir Stratford bad first been appointed mbaasador to the
Ottoman Empire in 1824 by Lord Liverpool and served in
this position intermittently until the 186o•a. 26 An ar
dent Pbilbellene during the Greek struggle tor indepen

dence, he had become alarmed at Russia's maobinationa
in Greek attairs at this time.

Out or tbia experience bad

emerged bis lite 1 a work, "tbe attempt to push, cajole,
or bullJ Turke1 into a line of conduct wbicb would juatitJ
26�., P• 115.

apera

Europe in making her a rirm barrier against tbe Russian
advanoea."29 Aa a result or bis influence this also be

14

came a guide line of British policy�
Tsar Nicholas was aware or British reelinga toward
the Porte, and until tbe outbreak or tbe Crimean War in

1853 the maintenance of the status 9l!2. in the Bear East
was also a basic Russian policy. He telt this vaa aa

neceasar1 as Britain did, it only to check Austrian ex
pansion; but the presence or the "sick man" or Europe
also show d him the advantage of an alliance with Austria
tor the future partition of 'l'urkey. Tbia was aocom
pliabed by the secret articles in tbe agreement made at

Munobengratz in 1833, and wbiob, to British minds, was
related to the old Holy Alliance.

Thia alliance, especially important
tor its provisions tor Austro-Rua
aian cooperation in an eventual par
tition or Turkey, ia one or two
great diploru.tio landmark• in tbe
biatorr of Russian foreign relations
betQre tbe Crimean War. Tbe second
landmark was the adherence or Eng
lan4 to tbe plan, after 1844. Both,
bJ a preponderance ot power, excluded
Prance from tbe partition or Turke1.30

Wben Palmeraton first heard or Muhobengratz bis suspicions
were aroused, and tbe aeeds of mistrust between Russia and

2 9c. w. Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations, 18151840," The Cambridge Historical Journal, ItI, (1929), 59.

30Puryear, England, Ruseia and the Strait , P• 35.
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Britain sown earlier were allowed to germinate.
In tbe ensuing years Nichola

sought to improve

relations with England and in th fall or 1839 sent Baron

Brunnow to London witb an offer to allow tbe Treaty of
Unkiar-Skelesa1 to lapse.

Lord Palmerston viewed tbe sug

gestion with mixed feelings.

He saw that Russian policr

�as not the annihilation ot tbe Ottoman Empire, but its
preservation under the tutelage or St. Peteraburg. 31 His
own feeling va1 tbat Turkey must be protected by Europe,
not juat by Russia.
During this time there bad been a widening cleavage
between Britain and France due to the latter's desire
tor intervention in Syria on behalf or Mehemet Ali.
I

,I

Ali

was Franoe•a protege, and a aerioua rift appeared eminent
between the two powers as Palmerston telt it imperative
to preserve Turkiab integrity.

However, England waa not

willing to go as tar as an Anglo-Turkiab allianoe vbich

Reshid Pasha, the Turkish minister, had attempted to
negotiate the previous winter.
Russia vaa well aware or tb

ditterencea between

England and 11,:-ance; and in 1840 the Tsar again sent Baron
Brunnow, one or Russia'• most astute diplomats to Londo»..

Brunnow•s instructions were to come to terms with Britain.
The result of the Tear's overture was the conclusion of the
31Sir Charles Webster, "Urquhart, Poneonb1 and
Palmer ton," The English Historical Review, LXIII (Julr
1947), 3 3 5.

Quadruple Agreement or Julr 15, 1840, "for the pacifi

16

cation or the Levant and establishment or the European
principle or closure or the Straits."32 In the Agree
ment Ali was offered Egypt

a an bereditarJ posseaaion,

and southern S7ria, among other terms, but onl1 upon tb
condition that be accept within ten da,a.33

Ali remained

intractable, and France was furious at being left out.
For a time France and England were on the verge or a aer
ioua rupture.

A second treat1, the Straits Convention

of 1841, found Franoe once again a partner in a European
concert which also included Turke7.

Tbe significance

or tbe Straits Convention was that it closed the Straits
to all foreign warships in time or peaoe.
The close cooperation between Great
Britain and Russia during the East
ern crisis ot 1839-1841 marked the
opening of an er ot cordial rela
tion.a between the two countries
which continued until after the out breaks or the revolutions or 1848.34

Cooperation was again the object in 1844 when

Tsar Nicholas paid a visit to London seeking a satisfactorr soluti

to the Near Eastern problem.

Tbe tangible

result of the trip wu the Secret Agreement or 1844 after
32Prederick Stanley Rodkey, "Anglo-Russian Nego
tiations, 1840-1841," Tee .American Historical Review,
XJOCVI (January 1931), 3 3.
33seton-Watson, Britain In Europ , p. 206.

34Rodke1, The Am.erioa.n Historical R view,

345.

a series ot conversations between tbe Tsar, Lord Aber-

deen, tbe foreign
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ecretary, and Sir Robert Pe l; and a

rew months later with the Russian chancellor, Count Nes
aelrode.

The Agre ment wa.s aometimea referred to as tbe

"Nesselrode Memorandum," and, as it was the result of an
oral arrangement, was subject to various interpretations.
Although not an ortioial paper, Sir Robert Peel, tbe Tory
prime minister, felt tbat bis commitment wae "no leas

sacred. •35

The Neaselrode Memorandum on Turke7 vaa definite

on two points:

both the Britieb and the Ruaaiana agreed

on tbe (1) maintenance or Turkey aa long as possible; and
(2) "to come to a preliminar1 under tanding on the details

of partition if in the future it became evident that Turkey no longer could be maintained . • • • n36

The ulti-

mate possessor of Constantinople and the Straits was not
agreed upon.

This fact became a matter ot controversy

in the crisis or 1853 and was ultimatel1 the basis for
British nullification of the Agreement.

The relative quiet in the Balkan area atter tbe
Mebemet Ali affair was soon shattered by the outbreak of
35Puryear, England, Russia, p. 52. Pur7ear quoted
tbe Earl or Derby as aa7ing that the Neaselrode Memorandum
w s band d over to each successive foreign secretarr, locked
in the foreign orric , and "invested with every accident
and circumstance tbat could impart to it the character of
a great state secret." (p. 139).

36Ib1d., PP• 51-56.

the revolutions of 1848; indeed, all Europe was thrown
into ferment.
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It is not in the soope or this paper to

deal with Palmerston's diploma.07 regarding the French,
Polish, Swiss or Italian questions, 7et hia principles
in dealing with these upheavals touched on the Eastern
Question.

His aim was to avert revolution by suggesting

that measures promoting internal improvements be passed
by the various governments tor their peoplea. 3 7
The revolt in the Danubian Principality of Walla
chia was the first in the Balkans to take its place along
aide the other nationalistic uprisings.

As a result or

tbe revolution Russia sent in troops, all tbe while stress
ing the temporary nature of the occupation.

Refugees

poured into Constantinople aa Sir Stratford Canning, the

British ambassador, became more alarmed at Russian ag
gressiveness.

He deplored the lack of some workable re

lationship between England and Turkey, and proposed a
treaty similar to Unkiar-Skelessi, substituting Britain

for Russia aa having political preponderance in Turkey. 3 6
Canning SUSo� ted this to bis friend, Reshid Pasha, the
principal Turkish minister, who, at first, welcomed the
idea.

However, a

the tension gradually eased in 1849,

the Turks were less eager to make an alliance with England.

37seton-Watson, Britain In Europe, p. 249.
3 8Puryear,

$ngland 1 Russia and the Straits, p. 150.

The Britiab reprea ntative felt that the rate or the
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Turkish empire waa virtually at stake at tbia time. 39

In this instance, aa was the later case when Sir Henr1

Elliot was her representative, Britain's diploma.07 was
shaped by the pro-Turkish attitude or her ambaaaadors
in Constantinople.
In earl7 October, 1849, a crisis arose wben

Austria was met with Turkish retuaal to surrender certain
Polish and Hungarian retugeea who bad fled to Constanti
nople.

England backed TurkeJ, while Russia upheld Aus

trian demands tor their return.

On October 6 Palmeraton

issued ord rs to the naval commander, Sir William Parker,
to take bis squadron to the Dardanelles and report to
Canning.

Soon after the British action, tbe French fleet

was also dispatched.

The British ambassador wanted tbe

Port under obligation to England, hence the use of tbe

British fleet in violation of the Straits Convention. 4°
Technically, the fleet did not actually force tbe Str it .
As a result of Palmerston's actions Ruaaia with
drew its diplomatic mission trom_ Constantinople, and
Baron Brunnow confronted the foreign secretary with the
threat that Russia would also diareg rd tbe Straits Treaty
if the British did so.

Palmerston felt it expedient to

39Lane-Poole, I, 3-5.

40Puryear, England, Russia and the Straits, p. 154.
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apologize, and Nesselrode informed the British leader

that "the Russian government would continue to be bound
bf the Straits Convention as long as the British cab

inet agreed to keep its agents within the Treaty's lim
ita. "41 The Tsar realized as a result or the fleet

incident of 1849 that while Palmerston remained in office
Russia could not count on England to maintain the peace

in the Near East. He felt that Palmerston was much too
bellicose.42

Lord P lmerston resigned as foreign secretary

in December, 1851, because of opposition incited b7 his
methods rather than bis views.

Lord Aberdeen, who be

e me prime minister in late 1852, telt that tbe beat

policy was to avoid any doubt as to the pacific inten
tions of Russia.

Palmerston, on the other hand, bad

taken the position that the occupation of the Princi

pal! ties, Moldavia and Wallachia, bf Ru.ssia was a oasus
belli. 4 3

Thus, the differences in cabinet opinion

caused vacillation on the part ot the British govern
ment at a time when its intentions should h&ve been

declared.

41canning to Palmerston, November 7, 1849: "Heither
the land defences or the Bospborua nor the available Turkish
navy would be round sufficient • • • were Russia deter
mined to risk the enterprise • • • • " l!?!,g_., p. 168.
42Ibid.,

p. 176-177.

43Bernadotte

E. Sob.mitt, "The Diplomatic Preliminaries
of the Crimean War, " The American Historical Review,
XXV (October 1919), 56.

While the cabinet in London supposedly directed
the course or British diplomacy, the influeno
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and con

trol by the ambas ador at Constantinople, Viscount de
R dclitte, in the rears preceeding tbe Crimean War should
be streased. 44

Although de Redolitfe has bis detractors,

there are also others wbo just as firmly believe that he
strove honestly tor p ace as he understood it, "the pre

servation of Turkey's existence as an independent state."45
At the outbreak ot revolution in tbe Danube Principal

ities in June, 1848, tbe British ambassador bad begun to

show alarm at Russia's ultimate ai

, convinced that the

Tsar would use the first opportunity or disorder to annex
6
the Russian protectorates,
ldavia and Wallachia.4 H
bad hoped to place these areas under the Convention or
1841, thus enabling Britain to exercise some control at
the mouth or the Danube. Great Britain bad alread7 in
augurated a policy or economic expansion in Turkey, and

"restriotionist Russia was in 1853 the great opponent of
British economic imperialism in the Near East."47

44s1r Stratford Canning becomes Viscount de
Redoliffe in May, 1852.

45sohmitt, The American Historical Reyiew, p. 69.
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Events in the Near East were alowly moving toward

a climax wben a dispute arose between tbe Greek and Latin
monks over tbe custody or Holy Places in Jerusalem.

It

soon developed into a political dispute between Russia
and France aa champions or the Orthodox and Roman churches
with tbe Porte playing off first one·power against tbe
other.

The Tsar claimed that various treaties bad given

him the right of protectorahip; and, in addition, he
had begun to view the collapse or tbe Ottoman Empire as
imminent.

Seeking to negotiate with Britain, be met witb

tbe British ambassador to Russia, Sir Hamilton SeJ'lTlOur,
on January 9, 1853; and in their famou

conversation said

"we bave a very sick man on our bands, and. it would be a

great misfortune if be should esoape us, eape0iall7 be
fore all tbe necessary dispositions bad been taken."�8
Lord Job.n Russell, then foreign secretary, opposed par
tition and turtber stated that any concessions by the
Sultan might lead to complete breakdown.
The Tsar was not to be deterred, and sent Prince
Menabikov to Constantinople to negotiate directly with
the Turks for a new treaty which would amount almost to
a Russian protectorate over all Orthodox Christians.

Tbe

Turks vacillated and asked for assistance rrom Britain.

48 seton-Watson, Britain In Europe, p. 305.

De Redclifte, who had resigned in January and returned
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to London, was asked to resume his post by Russell. He

received detailed instructions tnat upon his return to
Constantinople be was to

counsel prudenoe to the Porte and
torbearance on the part or Prance
and Russia, • • • be vaa left a
tree band in tbe que tion of the
Holy Places, but was to warn tbs
Porte roundly that its own misgov
ernment was largely responsible
for its present troublea • • • •
was authorised 'in tbe event of
imminent danger to tbe existence
of tbe 'l'urki1h Government• to sum
mon the fleet trom Malta.49

On

Marcb 20 Lord Russell bad written tbat "the Emperor

of Russia is clearly bent on accomplishing tbe destruction
or Turk•J and be must be resifted.MSO

Tbe summer of 1653 found the Fritisb cabinet para

lyzed by internal division , with Pal1teraton and Russell

favoring strong action, Aberdeen seemingly pro-Russian,

and Clarendon, the foreign minister, wanting to mediate.

Lord Aberdeen realized tbe need tor Lord Stratford to
receiv

very carefully worded instructions.

account

or

He also felt

that the Britiab ambassador was not consistent in bis

the Turkish government, painting wbat would

appear to be too glowing reports or its reform progreaa.51

-

49Ibid., P• 309.

.Sollis·, p.

-

314.

5libid., P• 313.

(Italics are Lord Russell's).
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On

May 31, 1853, the British fleet was ordered

to Beaika Bay, and Lord de Redclifte was authorized to

"suD1mOn it to Constantinople upon the manifestation of
hostile intent bf Russia,";2 which be did in September.

Tbua the control of British diplomacy moved trom tbe cabinet.

to tbe am.baa ador in Conata.ntinople. · Lord Clarendon

wrote in September, "Str t:rord, the real Sultan, though

he ostenaiblf and officially obeJ• bis instruotiona, lets
bis dissent from them be known and upon that tbe Turks
act."53
In a circular dated June 11, 1853, Count Nea

selrode denied that Ruaaia aimed at an1 territorial

aggrandizement, the ruin and destruction

or Turkey,

or "even at any religious protectorate berond that al
ready exercised on tbe basis or raota or treatiee."54

However, even though Unkiar-Skeleeai bad been ■crapped
Rua ia could still baae her intervention on earlier

treaties which could be used to step trom intervention

to oocupation.

Negotiations between the various powers con

tinued during the summer, and on JulJ 31 Austria sent

to St. Petersburg and Constantinople tbe "Vienna ote,"

52scbmitt,

The American Historical Review, p.

53seton-Wataon, Britain In Europe, p. 317.

5S.

54scbmitt, The American Historical Review, p. 41.

which wu an attempt at compromise between th Russians
and the Turks.
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Tbe Note reaffirmed "tbe SUltan 1 s re

■olve to respect tbe rights accord d at Kainardji and
Adrianople.n55
because it w

The Tsar accepted, but the Turks did not
not made olear that the protection or the

Cbriatiana should depend on the Sultan.
On Ootober

the Principalities,

4 Turkey demanded that Rua ia evacuate
llowing tbem two weeks to do so.

Russia would not comply, and on October 23, not waiting
the full two week , Omar Paaba, the Turkish military com
mander, crossed tbe Danube and the war reallJ began.
Henceforth, de Redcliffe appeared to work on the principle
that "war la tbe decree or the Fates, and our wiaest part
will be to do wbat ve oan to bring it to a thoroughly
good conclu ion."56 Yet, on November 14, be wrote to his

vite that "I am still labouring tor peace, but all alone."57
It can be concluded that had Russia truly desired to
protect tbe Christian population under the Porte, rather
than establish a virtual protectorate, she would not bave
continued to carrr through a policy wbicb would disturb

the 1tat9 quo in the

ear East.

Lord Palmerston, out ot otrice, beld bis own view
55seton-Wataon, Britain In Europe, p. 311.
6tane-Poole, II, 311.

>

S7Ibid., II, 319.

of Russian motives, and in a letter to Clarendon dated
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Mar 22, 1853, bad written:

. Tbe Russian Government has alwa1a
had two strings to its bow---mod
erate language and disinterested
proteasiona at P teraburg and at
London; aotive aggression by ita
agents on the aoene of operations.
Ir the aggressions succeed looal11, tbe Petersburg Government a
dopts them as a rait accompli wbiob
it did not intend, but cannot, in
honour, aeceed from. If tbe local
agents tail, tbe7 are disavowed
and recalled, and the language pre
viously beld is appealed to aa proof
tbat tbe agents bave overat pped
their 1natruct1ons.> 8

ETente mov d rapidlJ toward the outbreak of tbe

Crimean War after tbe 'l'urkiab naval defeat bf the Russian

at Sinope on November 30.

In January, a Joint Frencb

1654, diplomatic relations

were broken between Russia,

d

British squadron ent red the Black Sea, and on Februar1 6,
and England and Prance.

In England, the strong pressure

or public opinion forced the Aberdeen cabinet towards war.
Qu en Victoria announced to parliament tbat she felt
bound "to atrord active assistance to her ally, the S�l
tan."59

On

February 27 France and Britain issued an ul

timatum to the Tsar demanding tbe evacuation or tbe

-

58rbid., II, 62.

59Jobn Raymond, ed., Queen Victoria's Early
Letters (2d. ed. rev.; Bew York: Tbe Macmillan Com
pan7, 1963), PP• 202-203.
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Principalities, and when this was ignored, war was de
clared on March 28.

Tbe west&�n alliance between England and France

was proclaimed on April 10, 1854 to atop Russian aggres
sion.

Ten da,a later Austria and Prussia concluded their

own treatJ, in wbicb tbeJ made clear that "they would
onl7 go to war with Russia if sbe should decide to annex
the Principalities or to cross the Balkan range and tbua
threaten Constantinople."60 On June 3 Vienna issued an
ultimatum to Russia d manding the evacuation or Moldavia
and Wallachia, which was carried out in early August.
Had the two groups joined together tbe Tsar might have
bowed to a strong coalition; but as the Que n bad written
the previous January:
I repeat now what we have said
from tbe beginning • • • if Prus
sia and Austria bad held strong
and decided language to Russia in
1853, we gnould
never have bad
this war. 1
Negotiations were now begun between tbe western
powers and Austria wbieh led to the adoption or the "Four
Point " in August, 1854.

The program bad been first

agreed to by France and England.

However, it was not un

til December that Austria yielded to pressure and Joined
in the alliance ag inat Russia to belp secure peace.

On

60s ton-Watson, Britain In Eyrope, pp. 328-329.
61.!.ill•, P• 329.

December 28, the Allied Powers, as they were now known,
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presented the "Four Points" ot Vi nna to the Russian
plenipotentia.r7.

Tbe1 contained tbe following:

l. Tbe exclusive protectorate u:er
cis d bf Russia over Moldavia,
Wallachia, and Serbia was to cease,
and tbe privileges accorded bJ tbe
Sultan to tbe principalities were
benoetorward to be guaranteed ool
lectivelJ by tbe tive Powers;
2. The navigation ot the Danube was
to be tree;
J. The preponderance of Russia in the
Black Sea was to be terminated; and
4. Russia was to renounce all preten1ions to a protectorate over the
Christian subjects or the Porte;
and the tive Powers were to cooper
ate in obtaining trom the Sultan
the oontirmation and observance or
tbe religioua privileges or all the
various Christian communities with
out 1ntr1ng1ng bis dignit1 �r the
independence or bis Crown.6

Thus, Great Britain protected ber growing commercial in

terests by keeping the Danube and Black Sea tre , and also
checked Russian xpansion in tbe Balkans which threatened
England's road to India.
The intransigence or tbe Ru sian monarch ruled
out anJ oompromiae on the memorandum, which be rejected
witb indignation.
"not merel1

Victor1, for him. bad become a 111atter

or prestige but or personal honour.•63 Tbe

wa.r dragged on for another year. Finally, upon the deatb
62Marriott, The Eastern Question, p. 271.
63seton-Watson, Britain In Europe, P• 335.
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of Tsar Nicbolas in Marcb,

1855, and as the result or an
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Austrian ultimatum threatening var, the new ruler, Alex
ander II, accepted the "Four Points."

In addition, be

accepted a provision calling for tbe neutralization of
the Blaok Sea.

These formed the basis for tbe main peace

treaty which was eventuallJ signed in Paris on Marcb 30,

1856. Turkey was now included in the concert ot Europe.

Two weeks later, in a separate agreement, Great Britain,
Austria, and France pledged tbemaelvea to guarantee the
integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Tbe neutralization ot

the Black Sa and the determination to maintain Turkish
independence, however, planted the seeds for another
East rn Crisis in leas than tventJ rears.
Tbe end or tbe Crimean War brought "neither joy
nor aati1faotion" to the British people or tbe British
government.64

It has been suggested that Great Britain

"drifted" into the Crimean War beoauae
sion•

or the "dissen

or tbe Aberdeen Ministry, which could not formu-

1 te a polior definite and downright enougb to make

Russia modify ber demanda.n65

Both Mr. William Glad

atone and the Duke or ArgJll, member■ ot the cabinet,

denied there was any lack of harmon7; however, on the
other hand, a Britiab historian, Alexander Kinglake, baa

64Ipid., P• 354.
65sobm1tt, Tbe American Hiatorioal Reyiow, p. 54.

attributed the war to the partisanship or Lord Palmer-

aton for Turke7. 66
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Sir Spencer Walpole, a contemporary

British statesman, bas d olared that Sir Stratford Can
ning as ambaaaador to Constantinople steered Britain
into th e whirlpool.

Vernon Puryear, an American histor

ian, baa also blamed Canning tor tbe Crimean oataatropbe.
It might be nearer the truth to aa1, however, that the
Crimean War reflected a rivalry in the Near East that
bad to explode at some time.
ain in 1875.

It did ao in

1854,

and ag

Its culmination was World War I.

66For anti-government view, see:

Alexander William
Kinglake, The Invaaion of the Crim,an: Ita origin and An
A count ot !ta Pro resa Down to the Deatb or Lord Ra an
Nev ork: Harper and Brothers, 1 3-1
•

CHAPTER II
PRELUDE TO CHAOS:

1856-1875

Tbe Treaty or Paris wbiob ended tbe Crimean War
proved humiliating to th
thwarted aome their aims.

Ruaaians tor it ertectively
The neutralization of the Black

Sea I emed to arrest tbeir natural growth, while the na
tions of England, France and Austria became tbe protectors
of the Porte and ita various subjects.

For tbe Porte tbe Treat1 or Paris in 1856 meant

a new lease on life.
bia house in order.

The Sultan now bad a chance to put

Article II or the separate treaty

or April 14 stated tbat "any- infraction of th stipula

tions of tbe said Treat1 or Paris will be considered b7

the Powers signing the present Treaty as a casus belli."1
By the latter agreement the powers bad established the
principle that the rate or Turkey and the ultimate dis
posal of ber territories was to be a matter of common
concern, atfeeting the interests or them all.2

Treat

f,

22.

4
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1879),

The position or the British government after the
Treaty or Paris was hown in a

32

peecb given by Lord DerbJ,

a leading Torr:
Aa to the obligations imposed on
us by the Treat1 to do what we can
to protect the subject races or
Turkey trom misgovernment, the ob
ligation to intervene tor· the pro
tection of the Empire from external
attack impl es a corresponding duty
of control.

3

Tbe Duke of Argyll, who served in the cabinet responsi
ble for leading Britain during the Crimean War, wrote

the following appr isal in 1879:

It ia probably this Treaty vbicb
most dwella in the minds ot those
who imagine that the transactions
or 1656 extended to Turkey an ab
solute guarantee or protection,
irrespective or ber own conduct,
or or the rights or other states
in their relations with tb Porte.4

After the Crimean War the controversy in England,
however, centered on whether the Britiab commit ent to
interv•ne in Turke1 was baaed on the maintenance

or Bri

tiah "interests" or the protection or tbe Christians
under Ottoman rule.

Tbe latter issue was repeatedl7

raised bJ Mr. Gladstone then and in tbe rears to oome,

and by tbe retorm-minded Riobard Cobden wbo remarked

that "tbe Integrity of tbe Turkish Empire" and the 'Balance

-

3 Ibid., I, 35.

4.!J?!g_., I, 31.

or Power" were •words without meaning, the mere echoes

of the past • • • • "5
Conservatives,
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Argyll, a foremoat critic or the

tated tbat tbe1 considered the welfare

or the subject populations or Turke7 aa a matter or sec
ondary and subordinate oonoern, in tead of its being
"the very essence or the whole Eastern Queation."6 There
were others who felt tbat Britain could not intervene
und r any circu.m■ tanoes, 7et tbe Duke wrote that "in
tervention wu tbe rule and not the exception, espeoi
allf in regard to financial mattera."7
There was disagreement over vbetber an1 portion

or tbe Treaty ot Faria gave tbe Christian powers the
right or interference in regard to tbe reform or tbe

�urkisb adminietration.

In the Nintb Article it was

agreed that Turke7 should communicate to the power• a
tirman regarding the privil gea to be granted to all
classes of her population; but, it was to be clearly un
derstood tba.t tbe firm.an "cannot, in any case, give to
the said Powers the right to interfere, either oollec
tivel1 or separatel1, in tne �elations or bis Majest1

11lli,., I, 104.

the Sultan witb hi

subjects nor in tbe internal administration ot bia Empire."8
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While the powers were meeting in Paris, a con

ference took place in tbe Britiab embaaa1 in Constanti

nople between the repreaentatives ot tbe powers and the
Turkish ministers.

Tbe outcome waa ·the Hatt-1-Hu.maJ'Un,

issued on Februar1 21, 1856.

Through the

rrorta or Lord

de Redolitfe, tbe Sultan bad issued this text or reforms

wbiob

guaranteed to ever1 subject ot the
Porte, without distinction or creed
or class, personal liberty; equality
before tbe law; complete religious
freedom; eligibility tor office oi•
il and military; equality of taxat on;
and complete security or propert1.9

This reform document was what the cabinet ot Lord Aber

deen felt was vitallJ neoeaaar1 for tbe Christian sub

It also stated that int rference in
the Porte's at'talrs was oonclitiona.l.10
jects of the Porte.
Th

rear after the signing or tbe Treaty ot Paris

the problem ot Roumanian unity aroae to confront Europe,
ueation: An
9J. A. R. Marriott,
Tbe
H storioal Stud In Euro e
Clarendon
esa, 1 30, PP•
1 0w1111am Ewart Gladstone, "The HiatorJ or 18521860, and Greville'a Latest Journals," The English His
torical Review, II, (April 1887), 290.
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and again posed a question as to the attitude of tbe British government toward tbe rising nationalism in the Bal
kans.

Tbe union or the Principalities, Moldavia and Wal

lachia, was verr bigblJ thought of bf Napoleon III ot
France at the time of the P aris Peace Conference.

Even.

Queen Victoria telt inclined toward tbat objective, al
tbougb Austria and 'lurker were opposed to it.

British

diplomac1, however, based on the polio1 or non-interven

tion when nationalism arose, waa being directed bf Lord
Palmerston, and be was boatile.1 1 Hi boatility was made
known to the Port

bf Lord Stratford de R dolitte, tbe

British ambassador, and served to strengthen the position

ot the Ottoman government against union. 12

question

Regarding the

or nationalism, Palmerston bad previously argued

in the Houae ot Commona on MaJ

4, 1856:

It tbe Principalitiea had been in
dependent states, Europe would not
have taken up arma to ave them from
Russia; but that tbe war had been
rought because tbe7 w re outpost ot
the Turkish Empire, and because their
inv sion was a menace to its integrity
and independence which we deemed to be
essential to tbe interest or Europe.13

llA rupture between France and Britain over the
issue was averted bJ tbe Osborne Pact ot August, 1857 in
wbiob a compromise was reached on the Roumanian Q.ueation.
Seton-Watson, Britain In Europe, p. 365.
1 2 Ibid.,
P• 363.
l3tbid., P• 366.
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Thus, be opposed the demands of various Balkan peoples
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tor self-rule on the grounds that independence woYld lead
to partition, and would be the :t'irat step toward tbe d.ia
memberment of Turke1.

His actions toward tbe rising tide

of nationalism were followed almost intact by tbe Britisb
stat ■men wbo c8.1'le atter bim.

Tbrougbout tbe relativel1 quiet 1eara after 1856

British diplomacy continued to be a polio1 or splendid
isolation, although it round England "running trom one

[oountri/ to tbe other like an old aunt trying to make
up ram111 aquabblea."14 An era in British diplomatic

aot1vity came to an end in 1865 witb tbe deatb or Lord
Palmerston, a man who was a mixture of eigbteentb and

nineteenth oentur1 outlooks in hia attitude toward tbe
Eastern Question and toward Turkey.

He continued to urge

reforms upon tbe Porte believing it could improve,

15

a

belief that carried tbrougb even into tbe Disraeli era.
From 1865 to 1875, eapeciallJ during tbe 1eara

or the tir■t Gladstone government whicb was embroiled

in internal political retorma, an overly cautious foreign
14s ton-Watson, Britain In Europe, p. 387.
15Freder1ck Stanley Rodker, "Lord Palmerston
and tbe Rejuvenation or Turke1, 1830-1841," Tbe Journal
or Modern History. II.

policy was followed.

Suspicions were retained regarding
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Russia's intentions aa she enlarged ber frontiers aoutb
and soutb-west.16
During tbese same years, though Rueaia bad been
thwarted in ber aims in the Balkans bf the Tre ty
she had by no means given up.

or

Paris,

Her ambassador to Conatan

tinople, Oount Ignatyev, was convinced that Russian dip
lomacr in the 1860 1 1 must have three aima:

tirat, the revision or the 1856
Treat1 ot Paris, wbicb meant a
return to Russia or tbe c ded por
tion ot Beaaarabia, tbe abolition
of the Black Sea neutralization,
and suppre aion or the collective
guardianabip of Turkey and guaran
tee or all tbe Powers; secondly,
to secure command or Constantinople
and tbe Straits tor political and
economic expansion; and finally
some form or common action b7 the
Slave under th direction ot Ruasia.17

While the British oabinet concentrated ma.inly on
internal affairs, the Russians took advantag of the con
tusion which bad engulfed Europe at'ter Sadowa and Sedan.
On

October 31, 1870 Prince Gorcbakov, the new Russian

obancellor, issued a circular note to the powers declaring
that bis government no longer consider d itself bound bJ
16Frederiok von Hellwald, "Russian Advances in
Central Aa1a," The t,arterly Revi•w, CXXXVI (American
Edition, April 1874,
228.
17B. H. Sumner, "Ignat1ev at Constantinople, 18641874," The Slavo� and East European Review, XI
(Januarr 1933),
-343.

tbe Black Sea clau ea of tbe Tr aty ot Paria.18

r

Russia
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lt free to do this as a reward tor her neutrality in

the Franco-Prussian War.

Thia in etrect insured Prussia's

compliance with any move the Tsar would make.

France's

military predicament made it impossible tor ber to pro

test.

Prusaia 1 s ally, Austria, waa also inoapaoitated.

In response, tbe cabinet, in an apparent bluff,

sent Lord Odo Russ 11, tbe British amba11ador in Berlin,

to convince Prince Bismarck, the German chancellor, that

Britain migbt go to var with Russia, " ven without allies,
unless the latter withdrew th
consented to negotiate with th

obnoxious circular and

other aignator1 powers."19

Bismarck, not wanting to undertake another war, pro
posed a European conference tor the disousa1on of tbe
Black Sea question.

He told Lord Russell tbat the Rusaian circular bad taken bim by surprise. 20 The suggested
meeting took place in London in 1671.

18cneater w. Clark, "Prince Gorcbakov and the Black
Sea Question, 1866: A Russian Bomb That Did Bot Explode,"
The American Historical Review, XLVIII (October 1942), 60.
l9seton-Wataon, Britain In Europe, p. 500.

201t is generallJ r cognized tbat Bisin.arek knew of
Russia• mov a. "Ir the people t St. Petersburg were cl ver
tber would not make any declaration of tbe kind but would
quietly build men-of-war in the Black Sea and wait until
tboy were questioned on tbe subject." From Busch, Bismarck:
Som Secret Paf a ot Hie Riator , I, 312-313, as cited
in Morley, Ola stone, etc., P• �53.
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At tbe London Conference attended bJ Russia,
France, Prussia and England, tbe Russian action which
invalidated the olauaes dealing with the neutralization
of the Blaok Sea in tbe Treaty ot Paris was accepted

though unilateral br aches or international agreement
were condemned.
everely.

A1 a result Britiab prestige suffered

The government did not want to go to war; thus

the result was that sbe lost some of �be g ins or tbe Cri
mean War.

Oladatone•s inability to appreciate tbe dam.age

to bis position is illustrated in his statement that,
I am afraid our whole auocesa
[italics mine, baa been owing
to the belief that we would go
to war, and to tell the trutb,
I think that war, in some shape
or other was a possible risk • • •

•21

The weakneea ot Great Britain's position abroad

after 1870 was apparent and was one of considerable em-
barrassment, reflected in Bismarck'• comment that though
"England might bark she would not bite."22

In Januar7, 1874, elections were held wbicb brought

the downfall or the Liberals and Mr. Gladstone, due to what
Disraeli called their "negative and lethargic" attitude
21Jobn Morle7, The Lite or William Ewart Glad
stone (New York: Th Macmillan do., 1904), II, 355.
22Marr1ott, The Eastern Question, p. 282.

towards foreign affairs.23
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Tbia was not entirel1 correct,

but toreign artairs did play a part. With tbe advent of
tbe Conservatives and Disraeli to power, foreign polio7

again became "activist."24 Tbe Near and Middle East were

destined to be tbe focal points or the new prime minister·••

intereata, and early in bis term Disraeli wrote to Lord
Salisbury, b.ia new Indian secretary:

"The Russians may

be lying, but w oannot do more, so far as diplomacy is

concerned, than obtain from them auoh pledg s a tbe1 bave
given."25 Lord D rby, the new foreign minister, had earlier
developed a marked r luotance to take strong action, and

his apathy was to prove to be the despair or Disraeli in

the crucial yea.rs to come.

For under Derby, tbe govern

ment's co�rae waa still one of inaction and vacillation
toward events in Europe and the Near East.

An uneasy truce continued between the governments

of Ruaaia and England a

the Conservative ministry passed

its first rew montba in ottice.

onetbeleas, Disraeli

Gladstone

ro

d tbe
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bad reservations, and on June 2, 1874, wrote to Lord

Salisburr that be had "no great taitb in a real •un
derstanding witb Rusaia.•"26 Tbougb tbe prime mini1ter
desired to prevent

clash betw en tbe two countries,

at the same time be felt that DerbJ 1 s position or drift
would be fatal.
plete

On this be and Sa1isbur1 were in com

gre ment.
The relative quiet in tbe Near Ea.st was broken

in the summer

or 1875 when the long siDll'llering Eastern

Question again errupted witb violence.

volt broke out 1n tbe Turkish pro incea

In Jul1, a re

or Bosnia and

Herzegovina, an area more deeply divided tban others
among the Moslem, Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic
faiths.
dream

In Serbia the Orthodox church h d rostered the

or national independence; however, Bosnia and

Herzegovina were M.Ore Turkish. The ariatocrac1 was Mos
lem, and Bosnian Moslema were "M.Ore Turkish than the
Turks."27 Of the Slav peasantry tbe majority were Ortho
dox, but tbere was also a strong body of Roman Catholics.
In Bulgari

the aristocracy had also embraced Islam.

The

people, who were Orthodox, disliked pa11ng homage to a

26�1 Gwendolen Cecil, Litt ot Robert Margui
or Salisbury (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1921),

II,

so.

27Marriott, The Eastern Question, P• 319.

Greek patriarcb.28

The outbreak itself in Bosnia and

Herzegovina was due to graft, misrule and almost un
bearable taxation wbicb prevailed tbroughout the Otto
man Empire, eapeciallJ in tbe European provinces.

Re

volt was endemic; but the disturbing factor in the ra
pidl7 spreading Bosnian uprising now was its reperouaaion
29
in the whole t rritory or the Southern Slavs.
!be

declared aim or tbe insurgents was union with Serbia
0
and Montenegro.3
One turtber ingredient, although harder
to pinpoint, waa to be found 1n tbe revolt.

'l'hat was

tbe nationalistic element, foatered b7 Pan-Slavists who

bad been working in the area aince tbe end or the Crimean War. 3 1
At the outset

or the revolt, the powera, in

cluding Great Britain, showed little interest in the up
rising.

However, as tbe montbs passed a "diplomatic game"

developed between Count Ignat1ev and hie British coun
terpart at Constantinople, Sir Henry Elliot.

The next

rear the British government urged the government in Tur
to put down tbe inaurrection, and witbout outside in
terference.

Both Disraeli and Derby oppoa d autonom1 tor

Bosnia "apparentl1 from tbe rear lest tbe insurgents•
28seton-Wataon, Br!tain
In Europe, P• 512.
29�.
, P• 512.
30ll,li., P•

SlJ.

31Marr1ott, Tbe Eastern Question, PP• 319-320.

demand for land reform might create a precedent in
Ireland."32
Thus, the British government under Disraeli
remained committed to the same policies it bad fol

lowed in 1830, namel1 balance ot power, based on the

protection ot "interests," and, or gr-eatest importance,
tbe maintenance of the "aiok

lll&ll"

or Europe, the Otto

man Empire.

32seton-Wataon, Britain In Europe, p. 513.
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CHAPTER III

CHAOS, 1875-1877
Benjamin Disr el1 had been Britain's prime min1st r little more than a 1ear wben bis government waa
called upon to deal with the troubl aome Eastern imbrog
lio.

He felt that Britain, protected by ber great fleet,

was in a predominant position overseas, but, because of

the ties between Russia, Austria-Bungar7 and German7, her
position on the Continent was that or an on-looker.
Turning from Gladstone's policy ot strict splendid iso
lation, Disraeli felt tbat the beat eourae, especiallf

in regard to the Hear East, in 1875, waa to create "re

lations of positive law among the nations, by tbe concluaion of Treaties."

His aim,

wedge between tbe Eastern courts.

lso, was to drive a

British statesmen had gradually come to realize
tbat TurkeJ, not only after years or exhortation by Eng

land and ber own promises of reform, bad tailed to put

her house in order, but also that the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire was detinitel1 probable unless some re
torms were made.

Tbe government aought to empbaaize a

tronger Eastern polioJ witb the attendant publioit1
York:

1w1111am Strang, Britain In World Affairs (New
Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 162.
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initiated bJ the purchase or the Kb.edive•a share

45

in tbe

Suez Canal wbicb not only thrilled Britain but caused
anguish in European circles.2

Because ot the uncertain-

ties in tbe Eastern situation and the traditions or

English procedure, however, the actual abandonment or

the policy or shoring up the Ottoman Empire could not

be contemplated.

Disraeli realized that while be must safeguard

Britain's road to India, the protection ot Oon1tantinople
bad now becom secondary to the safety or Egypt.3 As
the crisis mounted in tbe Turkiab Empire the prime min
ister adopted a "wait and see" policy.

But he con

templated future action and the po1aibilit1 of alliances
in the Mediterranean with Italy and Greece to establish
England in a commanding position to ch ckmate Ruaaia.4

He was not a man to stand idly by when conditions ap
peared to threaten Britain's sphere ot influence.

The

Liberals, although in political eclipse, viewed the pro
Turkisb attitude as being identified predominantall1

with the maintenance of British imperial interests. 5

2Dwigbt Erwin Lee, Great Br1t,1n and tbe CJPru!
Convention Polio of 1 8 (Cambridge: Harvard Univer
) P• M•
sity Press, 1934,
3R. w. Seton-Watson,
eation: A Stud
acm llan and

tbe
itios

4Dwigbt Erwin Lee, "The Proposed Mediterranean Le gue
or 1878," The Journsl or Modern History, III (March 1931), 33-34.

'ills•, PP• 33-34•
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In July, 1875, there were many reasons tor Herze-

govina's revolt against the Sultan:

rental obligations

and taxation were the immediate causes, followed bf the
abuses ot' the 'l'urkisb administration, religious dit'f"er

enoes, and, ot great importance, tbe intrigues or tbe
Russian-backed Pan-Slav movement.6 This movement, while
not a coherent one, bad come into existence as the ris

ing surge ot national reeling was telt in the Balkans.
While the rebels bad no long-range plan for aelt-deter
mination, the rolea or both Serbia and Austria in en
couraging the insurrection must be noted. 7
Tbe rebellion soon spread rapidl1 into the
neighboring district of Bosnia, whiob, by Augu t, was
also in tull revolt.

The Balkans b d become once again

a battleground as well as a diplomatic pawn among the
great powers.
That the reaction of the British goverrunent to
the new outbreaks at the outset was essentially negative,
it' it took cognizance at all, oan be seen by the follow
ing note sent from Count Sbuvalov, the Russian ambassador
to London, to bis superior, Prince Oorohakov:

"The present

ot the B kan
tant'ord: Stanments:

and Align-

1950), PP• 66- 70.

situation in the Near East does not seem to preocoup1
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British statesmen and public opinion, wbo are • • • dis
posed to minimise the efteota of the insurrection."8
Though many chose to ignore the reTolt as just another
uprising against the Porte, tbe cabinet, however,
directed the British ambassador in Constantinople, Sir
Henry Elliot, to advise the Turks to "rely on their
reaourcea to suppress tbe insurrection."

or

greater

importance to Britain was the London suggestion that
the Turkish government should "deal with it as a loc
al outbreak or disorder rather tban give international
importance to it by appealing to otber Powers.nlO
The latter advice was tbe key to Britain's tears:
that other powers, and especially Russia, would be called
in tor assistance with partition the result.

The Mebe

met Ali attair in 1832, and Unkiar-Skelessi in 1833, bad

taught the British a lesson which they bad not forgotten.

Thus, when the ambassadors of Russia, GermanJ and Austria
in Constantinople proposed a deputation to investigate
the insurgents• demands and to consider Turkish reforms
8R. w. Seton-Watson, "Unpublished Documents:
Russo-British Relations During the Eastern Crisis," (1),
The Slavonic and East European Review, III, Document

#31, 664-665.

9walter G. Wirthwein, Britain and the B lka.n
Crisis, 187 -1878 (New York: Columbia University Press,
1935), P• 1l•
10l.J2.ll., P• 16 •

the cabinet a sented, but declared that it did
reluctance."11

10

"witb
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'l'hua, in 187S, Great Britain was determined to

adhere to her traditional policies or defending tbe sov
ereignty ot the Turkiab government against tbe rising
indignation or the other powers, and ·to avoid partition
of the Empire because it would be detrimental to British
interests in the Near Eaat.12 Disraeli, in bis Guild•

hall Speech of November 9, 1875, uttered a word of warn

ing to Berlin, Vienna and St. Petersburg "that, tbougb
the interests of the Imperial Pow rs in the question

were more direct, they were not more considerable than
tboae or Great Britain; • • • 'and those British inter

ests f"w�} are resolved to guard and maintain.•" 13
Disraeli based tbe whole or bi

Near Eastern

polio1 on the necesait1 to maintain the Treaty of Paris
or 1856, as modified b7 the Treaty or London several

years later. He became inorea ingl1 suspicious or the
role being assumed by Germany and Austria in shaping
11Duke or Argyll, Tbe Eastern Qu ation From Tbe
Treat of Paris 18 6 to The Treat of Br in in 18 8 and
to the Second Afghan War London:
traban and Co., Ltd.,
1879), I, 139.
and George Pe body
British Forei

, II , 9 .

13w. F. Monypenny and O orge Earl Buckle, The

Lite of Ben am.in D sraeli: Earl of Be oonstield {New
York: The
omillan Co., 1920 , VI, 1 .
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European policy towards the Ottoman F'Illpire.14
The British prime minister was now confronted
with a diplomatic arrangement composed or German, Aus
tria and Russia, known aa the Dreikai@erbund.
the first meeting

Though

or the three emperor in Berlin in

September, 1872, bad produced "no tripartite understand

ing, ••• a s ries or bilateral discussions designed
to soothe the rrictiona or the past," bad been b ld.15

In later conversations tbe situation in the Balkans was
diaouaae

witb the Russian and Austrian ministers, Gor

cbakov and Andraaay; and it bad been agreed that there
was need tor improvement or tbe lot or Turke7 1 a Christians.
The outbreak ot tbe revolt in

snia and Herze-

govina affected both Austria and Russia profoundly.

The

Austrians were f art'ul that a strong new Slav nation
might appear on their border.

Tbe Russian government

was torn between the opposing views of Count Ignatyev,
ambaasador at Con tantinople, and Prinoe Gorchakov, the
chancellor.

Ignatyev, a supporter or P n-Slavism, em

phasized the racial and religioua ties, wbile Gorobako ,
with firm. western leanings, reared that too strong a

stand by the Tsar would invite intervention by other
14Langer, Eyrop an Alliances and Alignments, p. 79.
15-aarris, A Diplomatic Histort or the Balkan

Criais, P• 52.

powers.

Hidden bene th the veneer or tbe Three Emperor
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League was the vague uneasiness over Ru a1a 1 s traditional,
though 1et to be assumed, role or protector or Balkan
Christendom.

Thus, in the late aumm r, the mini ter

or

the League pressed Turkey and the insurgents to negotiate
their ditreren0e1.

No other power was consulted.

The three emperors met in Vienna in Deoemb r, 1875,

to deal with tbe Balkan revolt without inviting tbe other
powers wbo bad sign d tho Paris TreatJ to Join them.
Count Andr4as1, a Magyar in control or Austria-Hungarian
foreign artaira since 1871 and apokeaman of the group,
pres nted their d mands to the Porte.

ing

With the rull back

or Bismarck, be took the initiative to press for col

lective action to force the Sultan to grant concessions
to the insurgents.

While Disraeli waited for tbe situa

tion to become clear, Austria, and also Russia, relt tbat

some sort of action was necessary.

The Andrlaay Note or

Nove�ber JO re ulted; and was communicated to all signers
or the Treaty or Paris or 1856.

It proposed a reform pro

gram for the Porte in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including
"equality of religions, abolition or tax-farming, res

triction ot taxes to the use of the province in wbioh they
were raised, l!L�d reform and an European oommiasion ot
revision. 11 16

Atter receiving the note on January 3 Great Bri-
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tain dela7ed action tor two weeks until the Porte, under
Austrian pressure, requested London to adbere to it.

In

acquiscing, Disraeli felt moved to comment that "we can't
be more Turkish than the Sultan."17 The English govern
ment 0learl7 did not want to intervene in 'rurke7, but
was drawn in b1 tbe action ot tbe Three Emperors League.
Lord D rby, the foreign seoretary, bad favored prompt
acceptance or the Note, but Disraeli had hesitated, some
critics claim, because of tbe consistentl7 T\lrcophil re
ports ot Sir Benr1 Elliot trom Conatantinople.18 How
•�•r, his hesitancy was the result of several problems,
one

or which was the etfect his acceptance of land re

forms would have on bis Irish polic7.

Tbe over-riding

-factor was the prime minister's tear tor England's position aa expressed to Lord Derby on Januar1 9, 1876:
I think it will land us in a
false position, and it would
be preferable to appear isola
ted, wb. raioj I usuallJ de
precate, than, tor the sake of
a simulated union, wh. -aio··
will not last man,- montns, ·em
barraaa ourselves, when inde
pendent action may be neoess ry.19

17 Buckle, VI, 1 a •

18seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone, p. 29.
19 Buckle, VI, 18.

The results of the Andrissy Note were negative
though adopted by tbe power, to whom it was sent.

Tbe

proposals not only tailed to satist7 the insurgents, but
tbe Porte had no real intentions of oarr7ing out the re
forms.

In addition, Britain's hesitancy in the matter

robbed it or an7 impact in Constantinople.

Tbua, as tbe firat tour months ot 1876 pasaed,

tbe situation in European TurkeJ grew more acute.

The

Sultan became more unyielding even as the insurgents
pressed tor more concessions, while in Europe, senti
ment was becoming more pro-Slavic and anti-Turkish.

In

addition, witbin the southern Slav lands and in Serbia,

a rising excitement grew among tbe populace.

Nationalism

bad become a volatile issue in tbe Balkans, and while it
would be dampened in 1878, its culmination was Sarajevo,

1914.

The next tbreat to Turkiab control in the Balkans

came on

Mar

6 during a riot between Christiana and Mos

lem• in Salonioa in wbicb tbe German and French consuls
were murdered by a Turkish mob.

Four days later another

riot in Constantinople led to the overthrow or tbe Grand
Vizier.

The three Imperial Powers telt that tbe7 coul. d

wait no longer tor Great Britain to come to lite with tbe
situation ao seemingly acute.
I

Meeting in Berlin, Bismarck,

Andraasy and Gorohakov, along witb Emperors Alexander II
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and William I, drew up the famous Berlin Memorandum or

Ma112 which proposed

an APmiatice ot two months, botb
sides retaining tbeir arms pend
ing negotiations, but added the
warning that if no agreement could
be reached during that period, it
would be necessary for tbe Powers
to take • tticacioua mea��res in
tbe interests of peaoe. 1
During the armistice the Turkish government had to ac
quiesce on certain points contained in the Memorandum
including turniabing materials tor rebuilding bouses and
churches; recognizing the right

or

the Christiana to

bear arms, and agreeing to the "aurveill nee by t'oreign
consuls or delegates or the application or reforms in
general and repatriation in particular."21 The Memor
andum, the work

or Andriasy, was accepted at once bf

F�anoe and ItalJ.
matter.

Great Britain'• reaction was another

In �ondon the cabinet unanimously retuaed ad

herence to the Berlin Memorandum on tbe grounds that
partio1pat1on in aucb a scheme, aocording to Disraeli,
"must end ver7 soon in tbe disintegration of Turkey."22
As oould be expected, one erteet of England's action was
20seton-Watson, Britain In Europe, P• 517.
21Harria, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan
Crisis, p. 298.
22Buokle, VI, 24.

to encourage Turkey to be more obstinate, while another
was to make her still more dependent on Great Britain's
support.
time

"It is not too much to say that, trom that

,,ia1f},..,.

forward until tbe eTe or the settlement of

the Eastern Question, tbe main lin s of Turkish polioJ
were determined in London."23 Britain at tb t time telt
she was correct in rejecting the Memorandum, but her er
ror was in producing no alternate positive proposal or
her own.
Events in the Balkans in

Mar,

1876, marked a

turning point in the solution or the Eastern Question
tor a tew years.

England, after rejeoting the Berlin

Memorandum, sent ber fleet to Besika Bay, just outside
the Dardanelles, because she had been led to believe
that Russia planned to gain control

or

Constantinople

and the Straits while tbe Turkieb government was in tbe

mid.at of a ooup d1etat.

Disraeli ao

re

red Russian in

tervention that, as he wrote to the Queen, the fleet

was not ordered to the Mediterranean "to protect Chris
tian or Turks,"24 but to uphold the Britisb empire.
While the major powers had reached a te111porary
impasse in seeking a solution to the Eastern Question,
23ward, The Cambridge History

eign Po1101� III,

9B.

or

British For

24seton-Wataon, D1erael1 1 Gladstone, p.

35.
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tempers tbrougbout the Balkans flared, and another more
serious revolt against tbe Porte began.
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Thia time it was

or Serbian agitation and rising
nationalism. This uprising was to be or great importance
to tbe course or Britisb diplomacy in tbe Near Eaat.
Shortly after th beginning or the revolt in
Bulgaria, rumors of Turkiab mistreatment or the rebels

in Bulgaria as a result

began to tilter into western Europe.

Disraeli, misled

bJ the misinformed Sir Henrr Elliot, at first minimized
reports

or

tbe trooities, and dismissed tbem as unfounded,

remarking on .Tul1 31:

I waa not juatitied tor a moment
to adopt tbat oottee-bouae babble
• • • as t all furnishing a basis
or belier that the. accounts subse
quently �eceived bad any juatiti
oation. 2;;,

However, his own private views ditf red.

Re felt that

be bad not been kept adequately informed ot tbe Bulgarian

situation, tor, in fact, the first detailed account wbiob
be saw appeared in the June 23 Daily News•
ister had writt n to Lord D rb1:

The prime min

"I must again complain

of the management of' your of'f'ice • • • it is impossible to
represent F.O • • • • without suf'ticient information."26
25Buckle, VI, 45.
26illA•, p. 44.

Aa graver news

or the Bulgarian cruelties reached London
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later in the summer Disraeli voiced tbe opinion that El
liot'

information b d been defioient. 27

While the attention ot tbe powers was centered
on Bulgaria, tbe militant spirit ot Serbian patriotism

was reviving.

Against the wisbes or·Pr1noe Milan, the

head ot state, the government advanced militar1 prepar
ations to come to the aid or their tellow Slavs in Bos
nia.

In tbeir desire to enter tbe conflagration the7

were joined bf their neighbor, Montenegro.

As war pre

paration mounted, the major powers urged them not to
act, stating that the1 bad nothing tot ar from the Turks
who were ao busily engaged elaewh re.

However, on July

2 Serbian troops crossed the Turkish frontier, and Montenegro d olared war the same dar.

28

Thus it came bout that two small
and backward princ1pal1t1ea flaun
ted the wisbe1 or tbe Great Powers
or Europe and aet out to aat1sr1
their ambitio�, by the time-hallowed
eans of war. 29

Britain was too occupied at this time to par too

much attentiontor by S ptember the reaction to the reported
27Henr1 George Elliot, So.me Revolutions and Other
Diplomatic Experi nce1, Gertrude Elliot, ed., (London:
Jobn Murray, 1922 j , P• 255.
26Harria, A D1plomatio Hiatorr or tbe Balkan
Criait, PP• 377.408.
29Ibid., P• 408.

atrocities in Bulgari
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reacbed its beigbt as the British

public became more aware of the real situation.
Junction Gladstone, the leader

At this

or tbe Opposition, found

tbat the agitation in Bulgaria was a live political issue;
and realized that bis opportunity had come.

On

September 6

be ia ued bis famous pamphlet entitled, The Bulgarian Ror
rorp and the Question or the Eapt, wbicb be dedicated
ironioallf to Lord Stratford d
Turcopbil. J O

Redoliffe, once a leading

In the work Gladstone expressed his in-

jured humanitarian feelings and inveighed against Eng
land's moral complicitJ with the outrages in Bulgaria.
He branded tbe Turkish race as "the one great anti-human
specimen of humanity."31

Act�allJ, the pamphlet pro-

vided the means tor Gladstone to attack Disraeli's hand
ling of the matter even tbougb John Morle1, Gladstone's

biographer, claimed that the latter's chief motive was
"a burning and innate hatred of all cruelty and opprea

sion."32

In addition the Liberal statesman felt a

30oe Redclitre, former ambassador to Constantinople,
bad come to ahare Gladstone's view on tbe decadence ot
Turkey and its inabilitJ or desire to retorm.
Criai :
Preas,

3lwalter

o.

1812-1878

Wirtbwein, Britain and tbe Balkan
(New York: ColUlllbia University

1935, PP• 84-86.

32John Morley,
stone, (New York: The

•

personal animosity toward the prime minister, for, ac
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cording to the Duke or ArgJll, his suspicion was "that

Dizz•a orypto-Juda1sm bas had to do with bia policy." 33
At the height of the outburst Disraeli had sensed
that public opinion would change as quicklr as it bad
formed.

He had gauged tbe aituation·oorreotly. 34

Th

tirst signs of dis enaion within the cabinet date trom
this period, however; partl7 trom tear that Britain
might b

dragged into a quarrel on the Turkish side, and

partly over the removal from Constantinople or Elliot,
wbiob the prime minister telt would benefit Britain's
conduct of foreign attaira in th

Balkans.

Early in 1876, Disraeli, now the F.arl of Bea

consfield, had been approached by Bismarck who sought
cooperation with England in the handling or the Eastern
Question in the event of an Austro-Russian rupture, and
who telt that Turkey might 1et be kept together with a
little goodwill.35 But tbe prime minister was mis
trustful or the cbaneellor•s intentions because
3 3.!l?!s,., P•

or a

552.

August, 1876, Disraeli was raised to tbe
peerage ae the Earl ot Beaconsfield.
341n

3 5oav1d

Harris, "Bismarck's Advances to England,
January, 1876," The Journal of Modern Histor1, III
(September 1931),

444.

brier w r scare in 1875 wben Europe felt that Germany
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might attack France once more. Toward Russia Disrael1 1 a
reeling were equivooable.

At times be felt that the

Russians were the guiding band behind the Balkan revolts,
wbile on otb r occ sions, as he bad remarked to Count
Sbuvalov:

"I distrust you neither iri Asia nor in Tur-

key • • • • I do not

uspeot your policy in Turkey."36

Thia is quite different from what Shuvalov reported in

January, 1876, that Disraeli and most ot bis oolleagu•s

disagreed with the views of Lord DerbJ, tbe foreign min
ister, "which emphasized a friendly disposition to

Ruaaia."37

In the autumn of 1876 tbe prime minister saw that

Turkey was apparently winning in her attempt to put

down the Bulgarian insurrection, but be tailed to see
that Russian intervention on the side of the Slava would

be inevitable it things reverted to tbe old status 9J!2.

or Turkish misrule. The Turke aaw in Beaconstield'a

rejection ot the Berlin Memorandum continued English
support tor their r gime, and little need to giYe more
than lip-service to reform.

36 seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone, p. 4,1.

37 Seton-Watson, Tbe Slavonic an.d East Europ an
Review, pp. 658 & 676.

The first man in the cabinet to become alarmed
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over Turkey's attitude was Lord Saliabur1, Secretary ot
State for Indie, who saw that tbe Turkisb alliance and
friendship was becoming a liability, and stated that
"tbe Turk's teeth must be drawn, even ir be be allowed
to live."38
When R�ssia dispatched an ultimatum threatening
to send tPOops into Bulgaria unless the Turks stopped
advaneing, it became obvious to Disraeli that England's
policy could. no longer :remain inactive and in a state
ot drift.

At a cabinet meeting held on November

4,

it

was decided to renew Lord Derb1'• auggeat1on or October

5

tbat an international conference be called in Constanti
nople, "in wbicb all the Guaranteeing Powers and the
Porte sb.ould take part."39 The Powers accepted tbe idea.
Lord Salisbury, known to be neutral in bis feel
ings toward Turkey and Russia, waa appointed as England's
Plenipotentia�y Extraordinary to the propo.aed oont'erenoe.
Be was one of tbe most able and competent men in Beacons
field'• cabinet.

Salisbury, well aware

or the Russian

threat to the Near East, had maintained a keen interest
in tbe Eastern Question.

He waa to represent a Britain

J8Lad7 Gwendolen Oeeil, Life of Robert Marquis
of Salisbury (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1921),

ff, 64.

39wirtbwein, p. 130.
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which had, to some extent, recovered her position or

leadership by having a definite polic1,

spirit to enrore it.

and

by having

She bad, moreover, suggested a

basis for peace in tbe Near East and for 'furkisb reforms,
a basis "rounded on the principle of European interfer

ence, and of demanding European guaranteea.»40

Britain

had now abandoned her policy of non-intervention and could

counteract the view that tor twenty-rive 1ears foreign
relations "b.ad been managed by drifting stateamen."41

Lord Salisbury left London on November 20 stop

ping first in Paris, and then in Berlin where Bismarck

attempted, somewhat successfully, to dispel bis suspicions
of Russia.

Continuing on his way to Constantinople via

Vienna and Rome, Salisbury wrote Derby that "the ditch

into which the Conference will tumble will be tbe obsti
nacy, not or the Russian, but of the Turk." 42 On Nov

ember 30 be again reported to the foreign secretar1 that

"in the course of my travels I have not succeeded in
finding the friend of the Turk.

believe that his bour is come."43

4o�.,

P• 296.

He does not exist.

Most

41Ralph A. Earle, "Tbe Eastern Situation," The
Fortnightly Review, XX (New Series, November 1876),�l.
42cecil, II, 102.

431..2.!.!!., p. 108.

Upon arriving in Constantinople, Lord Salisbury
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round his Russian counterp rt, Count Ignatyev, amiable.

He trusted Ignatyev more than did Elliot, yet Salisbury

r marked tbat Midh t, tbe Turkish minister, and Ignat1ev

were "the biggest liars to be round in Europe."44

Ignat-

1ev, himself, felt that it would alva7a be possible to

come to an understanding with England directly, if only
too gr at concessions to Turke1 were not made.

In bis

opinion Austria, not England, was the principal enemy of
the Slavs and Rus ia�S Botb

en appeared to have agreed

that the choice of Constantinople tor the conference was
grave blunder.

Salisbury considered the conference site a mis

take bee use tbe Turks felt that British policy was com

ing not only from him but also rrom Elliot, tbe British
ambassador.· On December 29 Salisb�ry asked Lord Derby
to remove Sir Henry because "be �llio!J allows it to

be seen that his sympathies are witb the Turks, and

against the proposals of the Powera."46

Again, on Jan

uary 11, 1877, Salisbury wrote that "tbe character ot

44�.,

P• 112.

45Alexander Onou, "Tbe Me ir of Count N. Ig
natyev," The Slayonic and East European Review, XI
(December 1932), 124.
46cecil, II, 118.

our Ambassador bas no doubt done something to ruin our
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influence, but the character or our policy bas done more."47
Disraeli, however, continued bis support of Elliot because
General Ignatyev bad also advised the British cabinet to

recall bim.

Writing to Salisbury the prim minister

stated that it this fact became known "we should be turned
out the first day of the session by our own men."48 Tbus,
Elliot remained, even though bis staying was detrimental
to British policy.

Lord Salisbury bad gone to tbe oont'erence "not

to coerce but to persuade," yet persuasion could not

break down the obstinacy of the Porte, supported in part
by Elliot's reassurranoea tb.at it would not be deserted
by Britain.49 Midhat Pasha, the new Grand Vizier, on
December 23 proclaimed an elaborate constitution which

in effect told the Powers that Turkey was embarking up

on reforms and the need tor foreign intervention bad
ended.

Thus, tbe Sultan refused to give the conference

any material guar nteea for reform and administrative

autonomy in tbe rebellious areae.

In addition, tbe Turks

felt that not only was Russia too weak to force any
47Igid., P• 122.

4Slbid., p. 120.
49w1rthwein, p. 130.
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concessions, but also tbat Great Britain would come to
On Jan

their aid as she bad always done in the past.

uary 20, 1877 the conference ended on a distinct note

or failure after tbe powers bad presented their last ul
timatum, withdrawing all their previous demands except
that or European supervision of the retorma.5° The
Turkish representative refused any adberenoe.

before S liabury wrote to Lord Derby:

The day

Your future policy will require
the gravest consideration. You
will have to choose between (1)
Helping to eoero; which would
give you a voice in the ultimate
disposal,---but that you will not
do.
(2)Allowing Russia to do her worse,
and if she attacks and wins, com
ing in to regulate Qer demands wben
peace is talked ot.51
After the close of tbe Con tantinople Conference be wa
to state in criticism that
English policy is to float laz
ily downstream, occasionally
putting out a diplomatic boat
book to avoid collisions • • • •
The system of never making a plan
beyond the next mov1 is bearing
its natural rruita.�2
50tanger, European Alliances and Alignments, p. 180.
5lceoil, II, 124.
52.lli,g_., PP• 130 & 135.

A further pronouncement, stemming in part from the
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con:f'erence''s laok or ■uooesa, was signed in London in
,1

March b7 DerbJ and the five ambassadors known as the
March Protocol, and called for disarmament in the pro
It was not accepted bJ the Porte.

vinces.

This deci

sion later enabled Russian diplomao1 ·to utilize the
protocol aa the pretext for war.
Even as the doomed conference in Constantinople
was going on, Russia and Austria concluded a secret ag
reement known as the Convention or Budapest.

It auper

ce ded the Reichstadt Agreement or Jul1 8, 1876 made

by Andraasy and Gorohakov in which they agreed to var/

ious aettlements when the struggle betwe n TurkeJ and
the two principalities had ended. 53

Tbe new agreement

of Budapest, however, set down guidelines for the even
tual war between Russia and Turkey.

Russia, to protect

her interests and secure Austrian neutrality, gave Au -

tria the right to "choose the moment and manner of oc
cupying Bosnia-Herzegov1na.n.54

Serbia and Montenegro

were left open tor further discussion, while Russia was
to bave a tr e band in Beasarabia.

53Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, p. 98.

54seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone, pp. 142-143.

A period

or

three months elapsed between the
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failure or the conference and tbe commencement of the
Rusao-Turkiab war, "English diploma01 bad aided in con
structing a bridge tor Russia but it bad failed to read

tbe temper of tbe Ottoman Turk."55

The Porte felt that

tbe contents of the March ?rotocol we·re derogator,- to

it■ dignity and independence.

Beaconsfield had tried

during F burary and March to avoid a olaah between Rua
eia and Turkey by suggesting parallel demobilization.
He bad spoken to Shuvalov, whose gover!lll'lent in turn, aent
Ignat7ev to London, but nothing oam.e or the overture.
Tbe event■ from May to September, 1876, had

forced the British cabinet to consider a more positive

policy of intervention, and now in earl,- 1877 the views

on implementation ranged from those of Elliot in Con
stantinople ot supporting Turkey, to Salisbury's pro

posal of "a bold initiative in partition." 5

6

The gov

ernment attempted to find a solution midway between tbe
extre ea.

Speed was necessary because on April

24 Rus

sia declared war on Turkey.

55w1rtbwein, p. 212.
(1792)

In rejecting the March Protocol tbe Ottoman
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Empire entered the crucible, for the Turks had calcu
lated tbat Russia at tbe la t nlinute would beaitate
and draw back.

On April

24 Russian troops cros ed the

Prutb and tbe Asiatic frontier or TurkeJ.

In ettect

Britain could do little because she bad no ally.

note to St. Petersburg on May 6 Derby mad

In a

it clear that

Britain wa■ prepared to remain neutral; but only on con
dition that certain apeciticallJ British interests were
not imperiled, namelJ keeping open tbe Suez Canal and
the freedom ot Constantinople.

In response, Russia's

roreign minister, Gorohakov, said that "as to Suez and
Egypt, we ahai1 not touch these two points," and as to
Constantinople he could give "assurances as to no per
manent annexationa."57

Tb

Russians telt th t to give

guarantees or even a t m:porary occupation would only
encourage prolonged Turkish resistance.

May, 1877, round the cabinet divided. Disraeli

felt that Lord Derby wa

inoreasingl7 negative in out

look, even aa the prime minister denied tbat the govern
ment bad an7 rigbt to go to war except tor the "interests

57 seton-Wataon, Disraeli. Gladstone, pp. 173 & 193.

of the country-."58

Tbe issue ot what con1tituted Bri

tish "interests" and tbe method

devisive factor in tbe cabinet.
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or intervention was the
Som , including Car

narvon, SaliaburJ, Northcote, and Derb7, were indisposed

to ally the country with TurkeJ because of factors in

cluding the neglect or ret'orma by the Porte, tbe Bulgar

ian atrocitle , and tbe failure of the Constantinople
confer nee due to Turkish stubbornness.

In April, tbe

prime miniat r bad proposed the occupation of the D rd nellea by Britain showing a rather bellicose attitude

toward Russian intentions.

Lord Northcote, Chancellor

or tbe Exchequer, in a memorandum stated

It cannot be denied that there
were real, though suppressed,
differences or opinion and feeling among
the members or the Cabinet with regard
to our Eaatern policy•••• Lord
DerbJ was chieflJ bent on keeping us
out or war • ••• Carnarvon was
strongly illlpreased witb tbe belief
that th! Prime Minister was desirous
or we.r. 9

As the aumm r or 1877 passed cooperation between

Derby and Be conafield began to decline.

They were at

odds over the beat policy ror the Near Eat, as well aa

58The Annual Re 1 t r:

at Home an broad for the
Rivingtona, 1978), 120.
59Buckle, VI, 139.

Review of Public
New Series,
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over the amount ot trust to be placed in Russian promises.
ithin the Opposition, there was also acute dissension.

Gladstone presented resolutions in Parliament "in favour
or 'local liberty and selt-govermnent• • • • and against
anr material or moral support to Turkey."60 William Har
court, a leading Liberal, deplored Gladstone's tactics

as did John Bright.

Tbe resolutions tailed to carry.

There was tbe danger that tbe Opposition would be split
by Gladstone's extravagances in tbe Eastern Queation.
Queen Victoria, who in June threatened to abdi
cate it Derby r main d as for ign secretary, tbrew oft
restraint and pressed Disraeli more and more to extreme
m asures.

It was with h r strong approval that Beacons

field appro obed the Austrians.

Neitber she nor the

prime minister knew or the existence of tbe

ecret Aus

tro-Ruesian agreement, tbe Budapest Convention, when
they approached the Austrians seeking an ally.

I
Andrasay,

the foreign minister, led them on tor a time until he
felt that he could not allow the Russians to believe
that be was serioualy negotiating with Britain.
At the same time Beaconsfield and the Queen,
60

Seton-Watson, Diaraeli, Gladstone, pp. 174-179.

without Derb71s knowledge, had Colonel Wellesley, the
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British Military Attache in St. Petersburg, inform the
Tsar tbat Brit in could not remain neutral in the event
or a second Rusaian ca

aign.

He was also instructed

to add, in the Queen's name, "a strong denial of'

1

d1 -

senaione in the Cabinet whicb would prevent active in

tervention.•"61
denial th
sian .

The British bad tbus revealed by tb

truth about cabinet diaaension to the Rus

In the tall Beaoonstield presented to the cab

inet a concrete propo al tor intervention on Turker•s
Re met with decided opposition from Derby,
Salisbury and other , and the matter was dropped.62

behalf.

Tbe Annual Register noted that the general op
inion increased that the premier's policy was really
war, and tbat he was quietly bent upon toroing it upon
bis colleaguea.63 Disraeli maintained faith tbat Tur
key could continue her surprising resistance.

On

61seton-Watson, Britain In Europe, p. 521.
620n Jul7 21 the cabinet agreed in principle to
a declar tion of war if Constantinople was occupied bf
Russia.
or inter at at this time was Shuvalov'a opinion th.at "the laok of agreement between Aus. tria-HungarJ and England bad a great influence on the whole course
or the orisia." Seton-W taon, Disra 11 1 Gladstone, pp. 224.

63Tbe Annual Regia;er, 1877, p. 12 .
3
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December 10, however, the Turkish fortreaa or Plevna

fell to the Russians.

Tbe limits or cabinet agreement

were set forth in the statement that

The occupation ot Constantinople
by the Russian torcea eTen though
it should be or atemporary char
acter and tor m111t r1 purposes
only, wou.ld 'be an eYent wbiob it
would on all aocol}llta be moat de
sirable to avoid. 04

Although public opinion in England at tbe begin

ning or 1878 supported Disraeli, divisions in the cabinet
and the equivocal attitude or the European powers whose

cooperation Disraeli needed to ch ok Russia prevented bim
from adopting tbe energetic policy be deaired.65 Tbe

split between the prime minister and his toreign minister
widened aa Lord Derby vacillated and threatened to resign
if the government took a strong line against Russia.

As

a reau1t Derb1 was almoat conq,letely b7-paased with tbe

real control or foreign affairs resting in tbe bands or
the prime minister and Salisbury.

Lord Salisbury, neither pro-Turkish nor pro

Rua1ian, round himself appealed to by botb the foreign

secretary and the prime minister.

In June, 1877 be bad

64Tamperley, Foundations or British Foreign
Policy:, P• 361.

65te, Great Brit!in and the Cnrua Conyention, p. 13.

remarked that "our foreign policy baa lacked a bold ini66

tiative and a settled plan."
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The summer marked a change

in hia attitude toward the atepa contemplated by Disraeli.

By Dec mber, 1677, Salisbury, "wbo telt that a testing

time was approaobing for British statesmen, began to range

bimaelf more and more b7 Beaoonatield's side."67
by the end

or

Tbua,

1877, the Indian SecretarJ b d beoom.e the

key figure in tbe cabinet.

On

December

24 be bad received

a letter trom. the prime minister which stated that "we

must oome to decisions which

are agreed and determined.n68

mar

convince Russia that we

Lord Salisbury, in the mean

time, bad stated his position to Lord Northcote�
An active policy is only po aible
under one of two conditions--that you shall help tbe Turks, or
coerce them. I have no objections
to the latter polioJ or to a com
bination or the two. With the for
mer alone I cannot be content. I
hold therefore, that Constantinople
is in no real danger; and that a
call to arms • • • may have the er
tect of involving us in war to up
hold Turkey • • • • It yill divide
the nation into campa. b9
66 cecil,
6 7Buokle,
6 6cec11,

II, 145.

VI, 205.

II, 169.

69Ibid., PP• 164-165.

He had mastered tbe facts or the situation more fully
tban any other Britiab statesman.

It was to be his

responsibility to arrive at some aooeptable arrangement,

after coming to the foreign otfice in early April, 1878,

tor Great Britain in the Eastern Question.
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CHAPTER IV

PROM SAN STEFANO TO BERLIN
March to June, 1878
Because

or

the potential tbreat to European

peace contained in the continuation or the Russo-Turkish

War, the tirst three months of 1678 aav tension rise
throughout Europe.

Plevna and Adrianople tell to tbe

advancing Ruasiana and Constantinople itself waa endan
gered, forcing the retreating Turk
armistice.

to appeal for an

Meanwhile in Great Britain, public opinion

demanded that Russia be stopped and the integrity ot the

Ottoman Empire be defended.

Jingoism appeared and swept

the country.
In late Januar1, determined to protect her in
tereata, and pressured bf public opinion, the British

cabinet not onl1 voted credits but also ordered the fleet
to the Dardanelles in spite of the resignation or Lord
Derb1, the foreign minister, in protest.

The Turks pleaded

with London to rescind the order rearing Russian occu
pation or their capitol.

Disraeli gave war and the fleet

was recalled, and told to wait at Besika Bay.

Derby was

called back ot office because bis influence in Conservative
ranks could not be ignored.
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He returned on condition that

the government pursue a policy or neutrality; but the
breach with Beaconsfield was irreconcilable.

15

The re

newal or the fleet's orders into Turkish waters event
uall1 let to the final break.
On January 31, an armistice was concluded be

tween TurkeJ and Rusaia.

Tbe stipulations of the agree

ment, however, were not communicated imm.ediatel7 to
London.

'!'be teru guarantee:
(l)

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

(7)
(8)

:&u1garian autonomJ, with annual
tribute, a national militia and
frontiers not narrower than those
proposed at the Conference of Con
stantinople;
independence or Montenegro, Ser
bia and Roumania;
autonom1 tor Bosnia-Herzegovina;
reforms in other provinces;
a war indemnity;
an agreement regarding tbe Straits
to follow;
immediate preliminary negotia
tions for peace; and
Turkish evacuation or Vidin Ruab
cbuk, Siliatria and Ezerum. !

It was aoon discovered, however, that the Russian advance bad not been countez-manded; and Sir Henry Lays.rd,
Sir Henr1 El11ot 1 s successor as British ambassador to
the Porte, wrote to Lord Derby when the arrangements
and tb.e

Politics

became known tb.at "It is

carcely neoeaaary to say this
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amount to the destruction or the Turkish Empire in Eu
rope."2

La1ard, prior to his appointment in April, 1877,

bad been the cbier supporter of Turkey in the House or
Commona.3

Pos1easing an intimate knowledge or Balkan

affairs, he bad written in tbe January, 1877 Quarterly

Review that the basic principle or Brit1sb foreign po1101 should be

the maintenance or Constantinople
and tbe Dardanelles in the bands
or a Power whose hostility and 8.Dl
bition England bad nothing to tear.
W Ctiav� supported the Turks be
cause they were there, and we bad
nothing to put in their stead which
would be equally aate and advan
tageous for us or tor the peace or
Europe and the world •.4

He teared that Russian influence in Bulgaria would make
her "eventually the complete mistress or Turkey in Eu

rope."5 He bad also pointed out tbe obvious tact that
Russian control or the Straits would endanger India.

!bs. Times felt that La7ard went too tar, commenting that
2Ibid.,

P• 311.
3lli.!_., P• 158.

-

4Ib1d.,
-'Ibid.,

P•

2Q4.

P• 205.

11
be is
convinced that England ought to
go to war witb Russia to avert
what be regards as tbe grave dan
ger or Russian aggrandise ent •••
but be is oarried awa1 by bis
dread and batred ot tbe Russians
and a lifelong sympathy litb his
friends the Turks••••.
Tbe new ambassador was genuinely concerned over tbe need
tor tundam ntal reform.a in the Ottoman Em:pire and blamed
the Turkish leaders for tbe unfortunate situation. He
wrote to B aoonafield that "tbis absolute want of states
men is one of the worst 17mpto:ma of tbe declining state
ire."7

of the

The role played by Layard during the

montha betore Berlin was later tbe
the House ot CoillJl'lona.

H

ubject

or debate in

was castig ted tor bis war-mon

gering as well as his in bility to control bis emotion
against those not sharing his pro-Turkish attitude.
It was not until f'our we ka after the armistice
between Russia and Turkey was
peace treat7 was negotiated.

igned, that tbe final
Kept in the dark, and har

rasaed by Ml ora from all aides, tbe British oabinet
appeared to be on the verge of d claring war against
tbe Taar.
6Quoted in Seton-W taon, Disraeli, Gladstone, P• 360.
7seton-Wataon, Disraeli, Gl dstone, p. 211.

The prime minister, always on the alert for more
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efticaoious measures to stop Ruaaia'a advanoe to the Med
iterranean, now felt the need to secure a firmer foothold
in the area which wo-uld sec-ure "the trade and communica
tion of Ebrope with the East from tbe overshadowing in
terference of Russi ."8 One auggeation vas a League ot

or Britain, Italy and Greece,
and the subsequent adherence or Austria and France.
When nothing came or the idea, Be conatield continued to

Mediterranean powers, made up

sea.rob tor "a new Gibr ltar in the Near Eaat,"9 witb the
island

or Cyprus

as a possibility.
;

Meanwhile both Andraasy and Bismarck watched the

oriaia between Rus1ia and Britain mount.

Tbe1 both

wanted to avoid a European war wbich migbt eventually
involve them.

In addition, Andria17 desired above

to stop the e tabliahment
trian borders.

or

11

large Slav state on Aus-

Tbua, in January, while the armistice

negotiations were going on be bad proposed a oonterenoe
as tbe eole means or maintaining peace.

Tbe next month

Bismarck also proposed the idea of a conference to ease

9seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone, P• 327.

tension.

He described himself as th

"Honest Broker"
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having no ax to grind with either Russia or Britain.
While Europe was on tender-hooks awaiting de
velopments between London and St. Petersburg, the terms
ot the peace treat1 be�ween Russia and TurkeJ, signed

on Marob 3 in the village of San Stefano, became known.
Negotiated by General Ignat1ev, tbe Treat1 was "an eloq�ent expression or Pan-Slav aspirations."10

It was

not until two weeks later that it was otficiallJ com
municated to ��itain.

The cabinet, in the meantime, h d

agreed to tbe conferenoe, now advanced to a congress,
proposed by Bismarck; and Berlin w a accepted as the site.
The British government laid down as an all-important

preliminar1 condition that "all questions dealt with in
the T:reaty or Peace between Russia and Turkey should be

considered as subjects to be discussed in the Congreas."11

According to the Treaty

or San Stefano

Montenegro, Serbia and Roumanja
obtained their independence, the
first doubling ber territory, • •
• • the third having to restore
South Beaaarabia to Russia, tnougb
obtaining Dobrogea as compensation.
ments:

1°'111liam L. Langer, Europe,m Alliances and Align1871-1890 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 138.

11 seton-Watson, Disra 11 1 Gladstone, p. 329.

A large part or Turkish ArMnia,
with Kare and Batum, was also
assigned to Ru sia. The Greeks
obtained nothing, but Epirua,
Thessaly and the remaining European proTincea ot Turkey were
to receive con tii�tions similar
to tb t of Crete.
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The most sensational territorial change, however, w s
in regard to Bulgaria, now to be an autonomous Princi
pality under an elected Christian prince, but witb a.n
area containing onl7 5000 square miles less than all
1
the remaining Turkish territory in Europe. 3 On the
aoutb "Big Bulgaria" extended to tbe Aegean and west
ward far into Albania.

Thia arrangement not onlJ caused

the Greeks diasatiataotion, but also tbe Serbs and Al
banians.

The Tsar 1 s pledge to support Austrian control

of Bosnia and Herzegovina waa completely overlooked; while
the last clause declared that "the Bosphorus and Darda

nelles shall remain open in wartime as in peacetime to the
merchant vessels of neutral states arriving from or des
tined to Russian porta."14
Britain In Europe 1789--""=.-------;i;;.:;.......,.i.....;_._,.;;;,.;::;.;..;;_.i;;;.;....;;.:::..:.=.1.c.. (Cambridge : The Uni13seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone, P• 334.

14Ibid., P• 334.
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Russia'• refusal to accept tbe British sug
gestions to J:110dit1 San Stefano convinced Disraeli that
the time tor action bad come.

On Ma.rob 27 he laid bis

proposal

tbe reserves were to be

before the cabinet:

called in, and Indian troops were to be brought through
the Suez Canal and established in tbe Mediterranean "to
neutz-alize tbe Russian conquests and influence in Armen
ia."15 With the final resignation or Lord Derb1 o er
tbia issue, British diplomacy pused into a new pbase
with policy moving into the energetic ban�a or Lord
Sali bury.

Beaoonatield appointed him foreign secre

tary knowing fullJ

aliabury ! s views, for on March 21

the latter bad written the prime minister:

"I am, as

you know, not a believer in the pos ibilitr of setting
the Turkish government on its legs again, as a genuine
reliable Power; ••• "16 Tbus, England "tacitlJ aban
doned ••• [tb�polioJ of Turkish integritr."17
Saliaburr'a first official act was to make public
with cabinet approval, an exposition

or British policy

15Buckle, VI, 262.
16Ladr Gwendolen Cecil, The Lite or Rob rt Marauis
or Salisbury (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1921), II, 213.
17seton-Watson, Britain In Europe, p.

534.

with regard to San Stefano.

This was the ramous Salie-
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bur1 Circular or April 1, 1878.

Tbe principal part ot tbe Circular was devoted

to the thesis that tbose parts of tbe Treaty of San Ste
fano which altered the Treat1 or Paria of 1856, muat be

discussed by tbe congress tbat h d been proposed b7 Bi -

marok.

Specitically, the statement criticized the ex

cessive cessation made to Bulgaria as a Slav state under

or prot ction ot Greek rights
against the Slava; and Russia's acquisition or Batum and
Armenia.18 There was also the general re ling that the

Russian domination; the lack

Porte could not function as an ind pendent government

under the Treaty.

Salisbury's pronouncement took Europe

bf storm, and injected a ray of hope to the peoples and
lands tottering on the brink

or war. Here at last was

decisive diplomatic policy by Great Britain!

Prior to tbe publication or tbe Circular, Bri
tain, Austria, Russia and Turke1 bad begun in March a
series or secret negotiations, apon■ored bJ Beaconsfield
and Salisbury.

Tbe latter had indicated his belier tb t

though the position ot Turke7 in Europe was beyond r pair, at tbe aame time tbere was little danger trom Russia
to Britain*• hold in India.

18

Be telt, nonetheless, it was

Seton-Watson, Britain In Europe, p.

535.
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necessary ror British prestige to check Russia's ad
wance in Turkey.

A

a result of the negotiations it

bad developed that the main point or conflict between
Britain and Russia was the torrner•s demand that the pro
posed congress discuss all clauses of the Treaty.

Du.r

ing April, however, Salisbur1 and Sbuvalov, the Russian
ambassador in London, bad several conversations whicb
culminated in the Ma7 30 Protocol.

In the negotiations

Saliaburr had admitted that both countries would have
to ooncede certain areas, but be telt it w a important
that Turkey's Asiatic empire be kept together.
basi

The

for bis position was tbe id.ea or "com:penaator1

provisions," that 1a:

a diminution ot Russian pr pon
deranoe in European Turkey in
order to ensure a modicum of
independence to the Turkish gov
ermnent was to be secured bf
England'• abandonment of her un
compromising opposition to Rus
sian conquests 1n Asia. But the
Russian advance in Asia was to b
counterbalanced by obtaining ror
England a concession of comparable
importance from tbe Sultan. 19

On

Mar

8 Sbuvalov left London tor St. Petersburg

to present Salisbury's demands to the Tsar.

On

the way

he consulted Bismarck regarding Britain's demands,
19Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, p. l.46.

essentially those set forth in the Salisbur1 Circular.
Upon Sbuvalov 1

84

r turn witb conciliatory answers from

bis government', t'urtber negotiations took place until

May 24 wben an agreement was reaobed.

Signed on

J 30,

tbe Protocol contain d the following points:
The English demand for a division
ot Bulgaria by the Balkan untains
was upheld, and the definition of
tbe aoutbern and western frontier
vu agreed to in a general way.
England accepted the Russian view
with respect to the acquisition or
Montenegro and Serbia, as well as
the annexation by Russia or Beaa
arabia, Kara,_ and Batum. Tbe pro
blems of billeting Turkish troops
in southern Bulgaria, ot European
participation in the organization
or the two Bulgaria•, ot the Rus
sian occupation ot Bulgaria, or
Russ1a 1 s right ot way through Rou
mania, and or the Straits regula
tions were lett open tor tu�sher
discussion at the congress.
Despite previous statements to tbe contrary,
England accepted Russia's gains in Asia because she had
a hidden trump card.

Wbile Sbuv lov bad been presenting

Britain'• term.a to St. Petersburg, instructions bad gone
ou.t to Layard in Constantinople to negotiate with the
Sultan, on a strictly "take it or leave it" basi , for

tbe British acquisition ot Cyprua.
Gibraltar

It was to be her

or the Ea t. The agreement with the Sultan,

2orb14., P• 147.

signed on June

4,
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provided that Britain would be ceded tbe

island if Russia was granted Kara or Batum by the congress.
This became known as the CJPrus Convention.

It was fur

ther agreed that "tbe Porte should give us specific as
surances or good government to Asiatic Christians, sim
ilar to those given in the Treaty to Russia • • • • "21
Even Salisbury, who conducted the majority of tbe dif

ferent negotiations, still retained some Palmerstonian
beliefs that tbe Porte could be reformed.
Wb.11 negotiations were taking place between
Britain and Russia, and Turkey, both Beaconsfield and
Salisbury were trying to reaob a pre-conference agreement with Austria.
consistently failed.

Begun in April, these attempts had
I

Andraasy continued to evade the

British proposals tor some form of joint action, and
negotiations lapsed.

Onl1 after the Austrians realized

that Britain bad concluded an agreement with Russia
I

did Andrassy show eagern as to reach an agreement with
England.

One was signed on June 6 ooncentrating on

the lines to be follow d by the two powers at the con
gress in connection with European Turkey.

In tbis

secret convention Austria promised to support England
at the congress, while England, in return, agreed to
21ceoil, II, 269.
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Austrian occupation or

snia and HerEegovina.

Also

included were limitations on tbe size of Bulgaria as
well as the
dification or Serbian rrontiers.22 With
the conclusion or this agre ment, Salisbury telt that the
time bad com for the congrea

to actually meet.

It bas been said that the May30 Protocol "pro

vided a basis of agreement tor the proposed Congress,

and • • • contains the embryo of the final settlement."23
Beaconsfield's opposition, however, embodied in the
Duke of Argyll, argued that by giving up Beaaarabia,
Batu, Arm nia and Bulgarian access to the Black Sea,
Great Britain was in no position to gain from the forth
coming congress.

Contrary to this opinion, Salisbury

cle rly b d the upper band when th
convened on June 13, 1878.

Congress of Berlin

2
23seton-Watson, Britain In Europe, p. 536.

CHAPI'ER V
DISRAELI, SALISBURY AND
THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN
Tbere are those who have said tbat the Congress
or Berlin was a taroe because all ,the major decisions
bad been made before hand.

That was onlJ partially true,

tor Berlin did d oide some important is uea.

Yet the

problems that were virtually ignored were to bear the
bitterest fruit or all in the 1ears to come.

Ev ryone

at the Congress admitted tbe expedieno1 of reoonstruot
ing the map of the Balkans along national lines; but
onlJ when it suited bis purpose and did not oontlict
with his own nation's "interests."

If the Congress was

a success at all it was becau e most or the powers wene
sincerely anxious tor peace.

It did succeed in averting

a general European war for tbirt7- ix Jeara.

But the

groundwork for World War I was laid at Berlin in 1878.

1

The German chancellor, Bislft&.rok, upon opening

the Congress on June 13 declared that its objeot was
"to submit the work ot San Stetano to the tree discus

sion of the signatories of the Treaties or 1856 and

lcbarles Downer Hazen, William Roscoe Thayer, and
Robert Howard Lord, Three Peaoe Congresses or the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917), �
P• 61.
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1871."2

These signers or the Treaties, b7 and large,
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sent their most aatute diplomat . Appointed ae Eng
land's representatives were Lord Salisbury, Lord Odo
Russell, and Disraeli, for whose career the Congress

marked the zenith.

The Briti h prime minister came to

Berlin with the prestige of tbe statesman who bad de
termined the basis on which tbe conference could aaaem
bl •3 Austria was represented by Andrlasy, the Magyar
tateeman, who wa

forced to pla7 a lesser role because

ot the lack or agreement in Vienna over acquisition or
Bosnia and Herzegovina. N vertbeless, be proved to be
Britain's

117 during the negotiations. France, who

bad remained neutral during the Eastern crisis, sent
William H. W ddington to act as a mediator.

The first

Italian plenipotenti ry was Count Corti, the foreign
minister, who

policy- was to avoid complications for

his country.

Sharing the spotlight with the Britiab delega

tion to the Congream were the Russian representative■•
A notorious rivalry b d grown up between Gorchakov, tbe
Russian chancellor, and tbe capable Sbu•alov, the
2w. N. Medlicott, "The Berlin Treaty: Fifty Years
Afterwards," The Quarterlf Review, CCLI (JulJ 1928), 8.

3w. F. Monypenn7 and George Earl Buckle, The Lite
ot Benjamin Disraeli: Earl ot B�aconetield (N w York:
The Macmillan Co., 1920}, VI, 31 .

ambassador in London.

desired
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Tbe eigbtJ rear old Gorcbakov

to pose aa tbe saviour or Russia,
winning more from tbe Congress
than he could bope to secure from
England alone, and to saddle his
irksome colleague Sbuvalov witb
tbe odium tor such oonoessions as
might prove inevitable, or more
correctly, to divide tbis odium
between Sbuvalov and Bismarck, and
to misrepresent them equally to
the Taar. 4
Sbuvalov, po ■ sessed ot real earnestness ot purpose, bad
taked hia reputation with the Tsar upon a peaceful set
tlement.

He realized that Russia could not bear the

strain or another war.

Turker did not want to aend a native Turk so sent
Caratbeodory Pasha, a Pbanariot Greek, an able and sensi
ble man but one who lacked real autboritJ.

Bia colleague

was Mehemet ili Pasha, a renegade ,rusaian officer.

marck treated both with utmost disdain, and �itb the

Bis

acquiescence of the other powers, isolated tbe Turks to
the point that the7 were excluded "from all the secrets
of the Congress and constantly oontronted by aocompliabed
facta."5

The e then were tbe men sent bf their respec

tive nations to decide tbe tat

5rbid., P• 445.

or Turkey-in-Europe and
Gladstone and the
and Part Politics
1.

or the Balkan peoples.

The le ser Balkan nations were
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refused admittance except to state their case or learn
the decisions ot Europe as to their fate.
Britain had come to tbe Congress buttressed by
ber pre-Congress agreements with Russia, Austria and
Turkey.

Tbe keystone• or British polic1 were a 1trong

Turkey-in-Asia, meaning adequate protection tor Turke1•s
frontiers; the control or the Strait■; and in general,
the maintenanc or her own Mediterranean intereata.6
Salisbury, having completed the Secret Convention of

June 6 witb Austria, looked to Vienna to preserve the
settlement in the Balkans.

Outside ot tbat area, Bri

tain's intereata centered on a "Turkey buttressed by a
ayat m."7 Tbe foreign secretary hoped that in the most
vital spots, Constantinople and tbe eastern Mediterran
ean, Britain's influence would be predominant.
alliance

The

or Disraeli and Sali bury appeared to concede

the tact that "Britiab policy bad abandoned tbe full
Palmerstonian doctrine upheld bf Dieraeli."8 However,

Disraeli was careful througbo11t the various negotiatiop.a

P• 382.

1789-

The

to see that Salisbury did not go too tar in agreeing to
Russian demands.
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The main bond of union between Disraeli

and Salisbury, wrote a critic, was really the maintenance
or the Conservative Party.9
At tbe opening

that th

or tbe Congress Bismarck proposed

fir t order or business should be the Bulgarian

question, one or the moat diftioult problems to be solved.
Disraeli remarked that "there is only one tbougbt---Bul
garia.

The sixth article or th

Treaty or San Stefano

is the real point tor whioh tbe Congress is assembled • • •
Upon its treatment depends Whether there shall be a

Turkey-in-Europe or not." 10 He adopted a rather bell!
oose attitude on his demand for Dlilitary and political
control by the Sultan over th
Eastern Roumelia.

proposed new province or

This issue bad not been

ettled by

May 30 Protocol, and tbe tone used by Disraeli
11
How much was bluff
apparently frightened Sbuv lov.

th

and how much tor English public consumption was not
known, but Bismarck thought it judicious to bold up
discussion until June 17.
During the intervening four days a British paper,

� Globe, publiabed tbe details ot the secret Ma1 30
9seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone, p.
view oan be upheld in Buckle, VI, jo6.
10 Buckle, VI, 321.
ll�., P• 319.

435.

Tbis
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Protocol.

Salisbur1 and Disraeli felt tbat the pub
lication was "a mortif7ing incident."12 The excite
ment soon passed, however, although the jingoea de
nounced the agre ment as a betraral and clamored tor
var with Russia, while tbe radicals boped that it was
the coup � grlc
When th

tor Turkey.

Congress reconvened, Disraeli mphasized

that England was completel1 opposed to the Big Bulgaria
as advocated by Russia in the Treaty ot San Stefano.

He

then proposed two amendments to the Sixth Article:
(1)

That the cbain ot the Balkans
should be the new frontier or

(2)

That in the country south of
tbe Balkans, tbe Sultan abould
exercise a real �o11t1cal and
military power. 1

Turkey.

The Russians disput d the e propositions, and upon adJournment of the session, the real bebind-the-aoenes
maneuvering took plac .

Sbuvalov accepted the Balkan

line, but the statua of the southern province round bim
reporting to tbe Tsar for instructions.

Bismarck there

upon proposed direct Britisb-Ruaaian discussions, with
Andraasy also to be present.

Di raeli, after endless

talks, stated tbat bis two proposals were a.n ultimatum
to Russia.

On

June 21 be went so far as to order a

12�., VI, 321.

13Ib1d., VI, 321.

peoial train to take him to Oalaia.

Hi

action threatened to "dissolve the Congress, and risk a war."14 He
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reported to the Queen that Bismarck was genuinely alarmed

and
was convinced that the ultimatum
was not a sham, and, before I
went to bed, I had the satisfac
tion of .knowing that it• Peters
burg bad surrendered. 5

As a result of Britain's pressure Bismarck bad intervened
and persuaded tbe Russians to yield on the issue of tbe
Sultan•• right to k ep garrison■ in the southern Bulgar
ian province, and to fortify the passes of the Balkans.

Ironically, these privileges, tbe granting of wbicb almost

ended the Congress, were never made use of by the Turks.

Russia bad yielded rather than risk war with England, just

as Bia

ck had come to believe that she would.

greas went on to abandon the Big Bulgaria

and b r acceaa to the Aegean.

Tb

Con-

or San Stefano

Bulgaria was divided, the

new principality in the south to be called Eastern Rou
melia.

Britain had gained a real viotory, but, tbrougb

ignorance of tbe actual terrain, abe had conceded some

important points:

Sotia was to be included in Bulgaria,

wb1le the port of Varna went to Eastern Roumelia.

The

Turks were horrified; but when Caratheodor1 Paab.a
14Hazen, Three Peace Congresses, pp. 60
lSBuckle, VI, 324.

1.
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protested, he was rudely silenced by Bismarck.
June 24 the question of .Russian evacuation

On

was settled by allowing nine monthe to eatablisb nev

administration• in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, and
twelve month in Roumania.16 Two days later a further
problem waa solved.

Tbe proposed Russian commissioner
in Eastern Roumelia was to be aup
eroeded by a European co11111daaion,
wbile in Bulgaria be was to be con
trolled by a oommi11ion ot consuls,
who, in the event or any ditrernoe
of opinion, would have power to ap
peal to the ambassadors at Constan
tinople. 1 7

After the Bulgarian issue bad been settled Bis

marck proposed that the next order ot business be the
question of tbe control
and Roumania.

or Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia

Since the Austrians were particularly

interested in tbe first three areas Andrasay

bad been

/

busily engaged in negotiating with the Turka.

When tbe

time came tor discussing tbe problem, tbe issue was still
unreeolved.

I

Andra117, however, bad been able to secure

Salisbury's approval to bis proposal that tbe powers give
Austria a mandate to ocoupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The

Ruasiana bad already accepted the plan in the Reicbstadt

-
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Agreement.

The disgruntled Turks, and also the Italians
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who had tried for two 1ear1 to create opposition in Eu
rope to Austrian occupation, were moat upset bf Salis
bur1'1 move.

The Turks, howe er, were pressured bf Dis

raeli to ao uieaoe.

He instructed La7ard to advise the

Porte to agree with Austrian demands.
When t�e matter was voted on, all supported it
except Turkey. Bismarck, in a threatening speech, warned
the Turk

that without the Congress the ottoman Empire

would have bad to face the fact ot San Stefano.
allJ, on Jul1

Pin

4 it was announced that Turkey bad agreed

to the Austrian position on Bosnia and Herzegovina.18
At the same session the new arrangements tor
Serbia were discussed.

Salisbury proposed that inde

pendence be granted "on condition tbat religious liberty
was secured in the principality,"19 eapeoiallJ for the
Jews residing there.

The condition was accepted.

The

new state was also given Mali Zvornik on tbe Bosnian

border, and the districts of Nia, Pirot, and Leakovao
to the south-eaat. 20

These territorial questions had

depended on Austria's backing Serbia's proposals, and
18Ib1d., PP• 82-84.
19Ibid., P• 83.

20seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone, PP• 461-462.
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in the end a treaty of commerce between tbe two countries
bad been accepted.

As usual the Turks protested, but

to no avail.
Several frontier problems continued to be a minor

thorn in the side of tbe C ongress, but witb negotiations,
tbey were settled.

Montenegro also received her ind -

pendenoe, as did Roumania altbougb the latter bad to res
tore southern Bessarabia to Russia.

In return she ac

quired the Danube Delta and the Dobrogea.

Aa was the

case with Serbia, these

tatea bad to agree to religious
equality of all citizen■ and the freedom or worabip.21
Salisbury, on July 11 in a declaration to the

Congress witb regard to the Straits, said in effect that
"the Sultan might oall up tbe British fleet whenever be
saw fit, or give permi sion tor the paasage of English
ships whenever be obose."22 Shuvalov objected, insisting

upon the multilateral character ot the previous Straits
settlements.

Tbe Treaty of Berlin upb ld the status guo.

Britain was still apprehensive about tbe Straits, but

neither aide argued further on the point ao the entire
matt r was left vague and undecided.

or

or

tbe minor points dealt with bf the Congress

2libid., P• 462.
22LadJ Gwendolen Cecil, The Lite ot Robert Marquis
Salisbury (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1921), II, 290.

the probl m or rectification

or

the frontiers ot Greece
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as not resolved. There wa no one present to champion

the Greek cau e except possibly Ital1 and France, and
they bad no real influence on tbe other powers.

Dis

raeli, while expressing traditional English-Greek friend
ship, "declined to go farther than to· recommend to the
Porte a Il'lOderat

reotit'ioa.tion, in favour of Greece, of
2
the Turco-Gr ek frontier in The saly and Epirua." 3 Ac
tuallJ, be urged an understanding between the two foes

more as a cbeok to Ru.asia and Pan-Slavism.

During the last week or the Congress the out

standing problems wbicb came to the attention

or

the

delegates bad to do with the delimitation or the new
Asiatic frontiers tor Turkey, and caused a orisia
sorta.

or

The tension was created partl1 by the tact that

Beaconsfield and Gorchakov inadvertently exchanged their

own secret maps.

The actual negotiations took plaoe be

tween Salisbury and Shuvalov and Hohenlohe, representing

Bismarok.24

The British foreign seeretarr bad remarked

that "Lord Beaconsfield can't negotiat :
seen a .map ot Asia Minor."25
23Buckle, VI, 32 •
5

He bas never

24seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone, P•

25Ibid., P•

4S4.

454.

In the resulting compromise, Batum was conver-
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ted into a free port and Ba7azid was restored to Turkey.
Disraeli had never reallJ approved of Russian occupation
or Batum, and at one point SalisburJ had threatened to

get permission from the Sultan tor British warships to

enter the Black Sea as a deterent. The British felt that

their interests had been safeguarded in th9 Near East

even though the Russians gained Ardahan and Kara, and

thus a foothold in Armenia, bJ the fact that Bulgarian
(and to British way of thinking, Russian) influence bad
been puabed back b 1ond tbe Balkan Mountains, and the

secret C7Prua ConTention had been reached with Turke7.26
During the week before the signing of tbe fin 1

TreatJ ot Berlin, the Cyprus agreement had been pub
Altbougb word

lished.

or it bad leaked out earlier in

Constantinopl , it was not known to moat d legates.

Though there waa some grumbling bJ France and Italy,
neither Russia nor GermanJ was surprised bf its stip
ulations.

The 'l'urka, however, b cause

or tbe Sultan's

stubbornness, refused to iasue a tirman permitting the
English to act.

SalisburJ then sent a drastic telegram

to the Porte calling the refusal "a flagrant breach
26Ib1d.,

P• 456.

or

faith and act of ingratitude"2 7 towards England, and
tu.rther threatened to occupy the island by force.
Sultan finally yielded.
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Tbe

Thia episode illustrated to

many that Great Britain's high-minded principles at

Berlin toward Turker were in reality onl7 window-dresaing.
The protection of British "interests" remained, aa it

always had, the guiding principle for any diplomatic ne
gotiation on the Eastern Question.

The Congress in one final action instructed the

Porte to carry out, without t'urtber delay, the improve
ments and reforms previoualy demanded in Armenia, as
28 It did neither. On
well s grant religious liberty.
July 13 the Treaty of Berlin was signed, and "tbe dele

gates separated amid a oborus
With the signing

or mutual congratulation."29

or the Berlin Treaty, peace

had been preserved tor Europe, and the Eastern Question

temporarily pacified, but at a coat.

Count Cort sum

marized the work or the Congress thusly:

"Everybody

was telling everybody else to take something which
belonged to somebody elae.n30
2 7�., P•

men ta:

That "sol!lebody elae" waa

458.

Gladstone, P• 457.
JOwilliam L. Langer 1 �ropean Alliances and Align-

1871-.1890 (New York:

iti-ed A. Knopf" 1 1950} 1 p. 164.

Prior to 1878 Beasarabia, .Armenia, Bosnia,

the Turk.

100

Herzegovina, Cn,rua , Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro
were parts of the Ottoman Empire.

These territories

were given up in the Treaty but Britain could claim
that though Turkey bad auftered h r integrit7 remained
intact.

She bad aurrendered Cyprus to Britain in re

turn tor "protection." The control of Constantinople

and tbe Straits was lett in TurkeJ1a bands as Britain

bad demanded tor years, but it bas remained a problem
plaguing Europe to this ver1 day.

The improvements

aupposedly forced on the Porte by the Treaty were never
really carried out.

Salisbury attempted to secure the

recommended changes bf sending men and aid to areas in
Asiatic Turkey, but with the advent of the Glad.atone
government in 1880, both were withdrawn.

Retorm tor

Asia Minor was foredoomed to failure.

The Congress or Berlin closed one month atter it
otficially began.

For the English it had been a great

Yictor1; tor the Russians a defeat. For Great Britain
the Turkish empire in Europe bad been preserved; tb
British route to the East had been secured; and her po
sition in the Mediterranean had been strengthened because
of Cyprus.

England once more appeared as a decisive

force in continental aftairs.

When compared with the Treaty ot San Stefano,

101

the Treaty ot Berlin diftered essentiall1 on only two

points:

(1) the "Big Bulgaria"

or San Stetano was now

divided into three parts; and (2) Bosnia and Herzegovina
were now occupied by Austria.

For the remainder of the

terms or Berlin, they oorrected eom or the flaws or San
Stefano.
The Treaty of Berlin was designed to solve tbe
most immediate problems which had brought the Eastern
Q;uestion once

gain to tbe fore.

the expense not onl1
peoples.

or

This it did, but at

the Turks but

or

the Balkan

or

European his

It was a diplomatic stalemate in some respects,

and as sucb influences the main trend
tory attar 1878.

The vital torce

or

nationalism had

been quieted tor tbe moment, but would appear again al
most immediately, and tinall;r errupt in the Balkan Wars
in 1912-1913.

In the ligbt or the deluge or World War I,

Disra li"s statement,

umming up the results of tbe Con•

gress, made after an attack by Gladstone is most ironic.

1wel

How tar have
diminished the
ob nee of perp �ally recurring
war on tb.ia question or tbe East
by the Treaty of :S.rlin? • • •
All we nave gained by the treaty
or Berlin is probably the peace
of a few years, and at the end or
that time the same phenomenon will arise.31
JlBuokle, VI, 356.

It is acaroel1 necessary to add that tbe Con-
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gress did nothing whatever, as it was hoped, to meet
the problems or the Polish nationalists, the reduction

ot armaments, the newly emancipated races of the East,

or tbe Alliance Israelite whiob came to plead the cause
or the Jews.

For it was characte�istic or
tbia Congress that in deference to its president, it care
fully avoided ever1 larger issue,
ever1 humanitarian queetion,
any attempt at b�ilding up the
law or nations.3

Beaconsfield and Salisbury returned in triumph

to London, convinced that they had brought back "peace
witb honour."

There was criticism, bowever, from two

parties though the majoritJ

or the country was generallJ

satisfied with both the Tre&tJ and the role pla7ed by
Britain at the Congress.

To the extreme Tories Turkey

had been betra7ed and ruthlessly partitioned while the
Russophils oomplained that tbe Ottoman Empire bad not
been sutficientl7 partitioned. Disraeli replied to both

groups o:r critics tbat "b7 tb.e Congress ot Berlin and the
CJPrus Convention the menace to E>�ropean independence

contained in the Treat7 ot San Stefano had been removed,

and the threatened injury to the British Empire averted.n33
32:a:az en, p • ,58 •

33Buckle, VI, 349.
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He further stated that the results gained bf Britain bad
been garnered without shedding an7 English blood or ex
penditure of resources.

Wben oalled upon to defend bis action in the Cy

prus Convention, Beaconsfield

aid that "in taking Cyprus

the movement is not Mediterranean, it ia Indian."34

Glad

stone had called the Convention an "insane covenant," and

its secret negotiation an "act ot duplicity," but tbe

prime minister replied that the time had come tor Britain
to act decisively, and interfere before it was too late,

He realized that for peace to be preserved it was necea
aar7 for otber nations to know that Britain would and
could enforce her policies.

said:

Speaking in Jul1, Disraeli

One ot the results or m1 attending
the Congress or Berlin has been to
prove what I always suspected to be
an absolute tact, that neither the
Crimean War nor this horrible war
which haa just terminated, would have
taken place it England bad spoken
with the neceaaar1 firmneaa.
So long aa tbe power and advice of
England are telt in tbe councils or
Europe, peace w111 ge maintained, and
tor a long period.3

Beaconsfield and Great Britain could look with

satisfaction on their accomplishments at Berlin, and in
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upholding the time-honored British position or "splendid
isolationism."

Britain bad played a decisive role in

the attempt to solve the Eastern Question and at the
same time ber •1nteresta" bad been protected.
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